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ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS:
THE QUEST FOR A DIGNITARY THEORYt
JERRY L. MASHAW*
If you are a man who leads,
Listen calmly to the speech of one who pleads;
Don't stop him from purging his body
Of that which he planned to tell.
A man in distress wants to pour out his heart
More than that his case be won.
About him who stops a plea
One says: "Why does he reject it?"
Not all one pleads for can be granted,
But a good hearing soothes the heart.,
The Instruction of Ptahhotep
(Egyptian, 6th Dynasty, 2300-2150 B.C.)
As the due process promises of Goldberg v. Kelly2 were revealed to
contain conditions that rendered those promises nonnegotiable in a variety
of contexts, 3 legal scholars attempted to change the shape and direction of
the analysis used in defining administrative due process. 4 Commentators
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1 1 ANCIENT EGYPTIAN LITERATURE 61, 68 (M. Lichtheim ed. & trans. 1973). I
would like to thank Professor John Leubsdorf of the Boston University School of
Law for supplying this citation.
2 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (hearing required before termination of welfare payments).
3 Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (hearing or other procedures not required
before state withdraws or alters status not initially recognized by state law); Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U S. 319 (1976) (hearing not required before termination of Social
Security disability payments); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (hear-
ing not required before nonrenewal of nontenured state teacher's employment con-
tract).
4 My own preliminary efforts appear in Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due
Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three
Factors in Search of a 'Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28 (1976).
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demanded a more "responsive approach to procedural protection," 5 dis-
cussed "the limits of interest balancing,' 6 attempted to patch up the "cracks
in the new property," 7 and described "associational aims" in processes of
public decisionmaking. 8 Indeed, quite apart from constitutional analysis of
the due process clause, Richard Stewart described the modern contours of
administrative law-as defined both by statute and by judicial decree-as
motivated by an "interest representation model" of administration that
seeks to involve in the process of decisionmaking all of the persons or groups
affected by any administrative action.9 More generally still, Robert Sum-
mers made a "plea for process values" with respect to all public decisional
processes. ' 0 The unifying thread in this literature'" is the perception that the
effects of process on participants, not just the rationality of substantive
results, must be considered in judging the legitimacy of public decisionmak-
ing.
I propose to label approaches that reflect this perception "dignitary theo-
ries" of due process. All such approaches attempt to develop an analysis of
administrative due process questions that focuses on the degree to which
decisional processes preserve and enhance human dignity and self-respect.
Although the writers who make up this emerging school sometimes refer to
values "intrinsic" to or "inherent" in the processes themselves, 12 it seems
reasonable to interpret their concern instead as a concern for values inherent
in or intrinsic to our common humanity-values such as autonomy, self-
respect, or equality that might be nurtured or suppressed depending on the
form that governmental decisionmaking takes.
In this essay, I want to make several arguments concerning the search for
an adequate dignitary theory of administrative due process. First, I want to
suggest why such a theory is attractive. But second, I shall elaborate reasons
for believing that any such theory must, if grounded in the liberal democratic
5 Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values: Toward a More Responsive Approach
to Procedural Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 111 (1978).
6 Note, Specifying the Procedures Required by Due Process: Towards Limits on
the Use of Interest Balancing, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1510 (1975).
7 Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property": Adjudicative Due Process in the
Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445 (1977).
8 Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process, in DUE
PROCESS, NOMOS XVIlI, at 126 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1977).
9 Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1667, 1711-1813 (1975).
10 Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes-A Plea for "Process
Values," 60 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1974).
11 There is other relevant legal literature. E.g., Dauer & Gilhool, The Economics
of Constitutionalized Repossession: A Critique for Professor Johnson, and a Partial
Reply, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 116 (1973); Thibaut & Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66
CALIF. L. REV. 541 (1978).
12 E.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 502 (1978) (citing Michel-
man, supra note 8); Saphire, supra note 5, at 120-21.
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tradition of American constitutionalism, be either prudential-and therefore
problematic and unstable-or extremely modest in its procedural demands.
At least as some have defined it, the quest appears quixotic. Nevertheless, I
will suggest, primarily by example, that a modest and prudential definition of
dignitary process demands might be significant, particularly in its influence
on the dominant "positivist" approach to procedural protections. Finally,
there is a glimpse of the phantom theory that seems to sustain the emerging
quest for a nonpositivist, nonutilitarian, robust, and satisfying set of con-
stitutionally justiciable process rights-a theory that I cannot here either
name or describe.
What my argument comes to is this: a dignitary approach to administrative
due process has merit. Indeed, a reorientation of procedural evaluation in
dignitary terms may have important consequences. The value of the digni-
tary perspective is not, however, that it would supplant a positive, instrumen-
talist, and utilitarian conception of process, and the procedural rights which
that conception implies, with a new vision of "participatory" governance
that would entail extensive new process claims. Instead, a dignitary theory
of due process-defensible in terms of what I call "the liberal tradition"-
reinforces the view that process concerns are intimately connected to sub-
stantive rights, views participation as potentially "bad" as well as "good,"
and makes modest "absolute" demands on processes of public decisionmak-
ing. If we require more, we require a reformulation of the philosophical
foundations of American constitutionalism.
I. THE APPEAL OF DIGNITARY THEORY
A. Intuitive Plausibility
At an intuitive level, a dignitary approach is obviously appealing. We all
feel that process matters to us irrespective of result. This intuition, may, of
course, be a delusion. We may be so accustomed to rationalizing demands
for improvement in our personal prospects on the purportedly neutral terms
of process fairness that we can no longer distinguish between outcome-
oriented motives and process-oriented arguments. Thibaut and Walker's
experimental work,' 3 which tends to demonstrate that (at least under certain
circumstances) people seek to maximize their personal involvement in deci-
sional processes and that they gauge the fairness of processes by the degree
of that participation,' 4 may, after all, merely demonstrate that we generally
regard control or the opportunity for personal strategic behavior as the best
protection for our substantive concerns.' 5
13 J. THIBAUT & L. WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1975); Walker, Lind &
Thibaut, The Relation Between Procedural and Distributive Justice, 65 VA. L. REV.
1401 (1979).
14 J. THIBAUT & L. WALKER, supra note 13, at 1-2, 117-24; Walker, Lind &
Thibaut, supra note 13, at 1415-20.
15 I do not mean to imply that the studies by Thibaut, Walker, et al., fail to
1981]
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Yet, there seems to be something to the intuition that process itself
matters. We do distinguish between losing and being treated unfairly. And,
however fuzzy our articulation of the process characteristics that yield a
sense of unfairness, it is commonplace for us to describe process affronts as
somehow related to disrespect for our individuality, to our not being taken
seriously as persons. 16
Imagine, for example, being excluded from voting. Disenfranchisement in
a general election carries with it a loss of political power so minute that cold
calculation should convince us that our personal franchise is in practical,
political terms valueless. 17 Yet something-the affront to our self-image as
citizens, the sense of unfairness from exclusion-has led some of us to
pursue this "valueless" privilege to participate in political decisionmaking
through every available court.'" Involvement in the process of political
decisionmaking, via the exercise of a right to voter participation, seems to be
valued for its own sake. The same may well be true for other processes.19
B. Avoiding the Positivist Trap
The appeal of a dignitary approach goes beyond simple intuition. Analysis
in terms of dignitary values holds out a prospect for avoiding the "positivist
trap" that plagues contemporary due process decisions.
20
The trap has two jaws. It may spring shut either on the threshold question
of the legal characterization of the interest "held" by the complaining party
(i.e., is it a "life," "liberty," or "property" interest?), 21 or later, when the
distinguish between perceptions of means (process) and ends (outcomes). I do not,
however, believe that they have been able to isolate perceptions of process that relate
necessarily to some dimension of process other than its potential to provide a
favorable outcome via either personal participation or the participation of an advo-
cate committed to the claimant's cause. Indeed, their account of what is at work in a
favorable or unfavorable perception of processes seems rather muddled. See Walker,
Lind & Thibaut, supra note 13, at 1415-20.
16 As Justice Brennan, writing for himself and Justices White and Marshall, put it in
Paul v. Davis, "I have always thought that one of this Court's most important roles is
to [protect] the legitimate expectations of every person to innate human dignity and
.sense of worth." 424 U.S. 693, 734-35 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). For similar
sentiments, see the cases collected in Saphire, supra note 5, at 121-24.
17 See J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962).
'8 See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969);
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
19 Examples of other types of process exclusions are developed in Summers,
supra note 10, at 1-30.
20 See generally Michelman, supra note 8; Van Alstyne, supra note 7.
2 See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972) ("[T]o determine
whether due process requirements apply in the first place, we must look ... to the
nature of the interest at stake .... We must look to see if the interest is within the
Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property.") (citation omitted);
Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793, 801-02 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
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court comes to assess the "value" of that interest vis-a-vis governmental
interests in efficiency, efficacy, or the like.2 2 The trap at the threshold of due
process adjudication might be articulated in terms of an imaginary dialogue
in a federal district court:
23
Court: What is your claim?
Citizen (former public school teacher): I was fired from my teaching job
without a hearing. I am here to claim my due process rights.
Court: What is your interest in this claim?
Citizen (puzzled): Well, isn't that obvious? I want a chance to defend
myself, and I want my job back.
Court: Wait, you misunderstood me. I want to know what interest you
have that qualifies under the due process clause as an interest in "life,"
"liberty," or "property."
Citizen: Well, it's my life, isn't it? And, if I can't teach where I want to,
I have lost my liberty. It is even possible, I guess, to say that I have lost
property-my income-but that way of talking seems a little funny to
me.
Court: Where does it say that you have a "liberty" to teach in your
former school?
Citizen: Eh?
Court: Well, surely there is no general liberty to teach in your school.
People can't walk in off the street and take up teaching anytime they
want. What gives you that "liberty"?
1039 (1980) (" '[T]here can be no claim of a denial of due process, either substantive
or procedural, absent deprivation of either a liberty or property right.' ") (quoting
Eichman v. Indiana St. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 597 F.2d 1104 (7th Cir. 1979)). "Life"
interests are rarely found or discussed. Cf. 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE 348 (2d ed. 1979) (arguing that " 'Life' never has its source in [positive]
law"). See generally Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62 CORNELL L.
REV. 405 (1977).
22 The Supreme Court has identified the following three factors as relevant in the
balancing test that determines what process a claimant is due:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;
and finally, the government's interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirements [sought by the claimant] would entail.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
23 This dialogue was suggested by the facts of Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564 (1972).
1981]
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Citizen: Oh, I get it. The School Board hired me to teach there.
Court: O.K. So your "liberty" interest-or maybe we had better call
it a "property" interest-is based on a contract with the School Board.
What does the contract say?
Citizen: Well, it doesn't really say anything much. I have a letter that
says that I was appointed at such and such a salary. But that's about it.
Court: Did the notice of appointment say anything about removal?
Citizen: No. But I assumed, if it came to that, there would be some
fair way of going about it-not just dismissal with no hearing.
Court: But surely you don't think you can force a hearing on the Board
just because you assumed there would be one? You wouldn't think that
the Board could require you to clean the school's restrooms just be-
cause they had assumed when you were hired that you wouldn't mind
adding that to your duties?
Citizen: Well, no, but ....
Court: Now, I don't mean to say that you don't have a property interest
here in retaining your job until dismissed after a fair hearing. It may be
that such an interest is "implied" in the contract of employment.
Citizen (warily): You say "implied" like it has some special meaning.
How do we find out whether hearings are "implied" by my contract?
Court: Well, there are several places to look. The School Board may
have rules or regulations that say something about dismissal. There may
be general statutes or common-law principles in your state that provide
an interest in hearings before dismissal from public employment. In-
deed, if you could establish that hearings were the practice of the School
Board in such cases, or that it led teachers generally to believe that
there would be hearings associated with dismissals, I might find that you
had a sufficiently reasonable expectation of a hearing that it was an
implicit part of your property interest in your teaching contract.
Citizen: O.K. I will see what I can find.
(Later, dejectedly) Well, I am afraid I couldn't find much. The rules
just say that "teachers' appointments are for a stated term or during
adequate performance." I am not even sure what that means. The only
mention of a process relating to dismissal is a voting rule for the Board
that requires a majority vote for personnel actions made on the recom-
mendation of a school principal and a two-thirds majority for all such
actions in other cases. So far as I can tell there have never been any
hearings-at least there aren't any records. The general statutes are
silent and the courts have never really decided the question. In all
candor, though, I have to tell you that there is a lot of stuff in some
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judicial opinions about the "presumption" that employment contracts
are terminable "at will."
Court: Well, I am not too surprised. State law is often like that. But, as
you seem to suspect, this report eliminates your due process claim. You
don't have a "legal interest" to assert.
Citizen: I rather thought you might say that. I'll go away now, but
before I go, could I ask a question?
Court: Sure.
Citizen: Why is it that, although I came in here to assert a federal
constitutional right, all we have talked about are contracts, state stat-
utes, School Board regulations and state common law?
Court: Because that's where we find the interests that the due process
clause talks about, in the existing positive law of some jurisdiction. You
don't expect us to just make these interests up, do you?
Citizen: No, I guess not. But I didn't expect the School Board to get to
make them up either. In fact, if they had agreed by contract or regula-
tion to give me a hearing, I don't see why I would need constitutional
protection in the first place.
Court: Next case.
The positivist trap need not, of course, have sprung shut on our citizen-
school teacher at the threshold of his claim. Back with his report on the state
of the positive law in his jurisdiction, a more sympathetic response was
possible:
Court: I see. Well, the School Board's rules certainly suggest something
more than tenure at will. They seem to contemplate either a fixed term
or tenure during good behavior. And the latter standard must presume
some good faith method of determining the adequacy of the teacher's
performance. Otherwise "adequate performance" would be the func-
tional equivalent of "at will." I think you have demonstrated a sufficient
property interest to justify a claim that due process demands some
reasonable procedure for ascertaining the facts concerning the grounds
for dismissal. Let's go forward with an inquiry into what process was,
indeed, due here.
But the steel spring of positivist logic remains cocked. The satisfaction of
positivism's threshold test does not preclude positivism's application to the
case later on, when it comes time to elaborate the specific requirements of
due process. Let us return to the courtroom.
Citizen: Great. When do I get my hearing? Who issues the subpoenas
for my witnesses? Will the Board get a stenographer, or should I bring
my tape recorder? What . . ..
1981]
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Court: Not so fast. We haven't decided what kind of hearing is neces-
sary here. Besides, the City Attorney is waving something at me.
City Attorney: That's right, your honor. I have an affidavit here that
states that the dismissal in question was by majority vote of the Board
on the basis of a recommendation of the teacher's principal. This case
should be dismissed.
Court: Well, I am glad to hear that the Board followed its own rules. But
what does that have to do with the plaintiff's due process claim?
City Attorney: That's perfectly straightforward, your honor. The plain-
tiff's interest is one based on the implied promise of the Board's rules.
But, surely he can't read some but not all of the rules. And, the rules
provide a procedure-recommendation of the principal plus a majority
vote of the Board. If the plaintiff expected more, that expectation had
no basis in the rules or the general law of this state. It was a simple,
subjective expectation (indeed, I might call it a hope or a wish), and we
already know that that cannot provide the basis for imposing additional
procedures on the Board. The plaintiff has had the process that was due.
Court: There is a certain logic to your position. But how does this fit
into the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test?
2 4
City Attorney: Perfectly. The first question in that test is the importance
of the claimant's interest. Now as we know, that can't mean the impor-
tance the claimant attaches to it. Otherwise we are back to subjective
measures-every person would be able to define his or her own process.
The question is what importance or value can be reasonably assigned to
the interest asserted.
Now it's obvious that the value of an interest includes not only its
substantive definition, but also the prospect that any particular person
can claim or defend it. In short, the value of an interest is precisely its
substantive value to the holder discounted by the probability of its
retention. And, of course, the probability of retention is determined by
the security of expectations provided by the jOrocess for allocating the
substantive interest.
In this case, if you allow the plaintiff more process than the rules
specify, you are creating that process for the protection of an interest
that is nowhere specified in the positive law. The process set out in the
rules both determines the real value of the plaintiff's interest in his
employment contract and protects it to the full extent that procedural
protection is due.
Court: I am still troubled. What role is there for the due process clause
in all this?
City Attorney: In a case like this, only to stand behind the rules and
24 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). See note 22 supra.
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ensure uniform application-no cooking up of special procedures for
particular cases. If there were no procedure specified at all, then you
might have to supply some via due process.
Citizen: But this is an outrage. Surely the court doesn't sit here to
enforce the School Board's crummy rules?
City Attorney: I understand that you are angry. But the law doesn't
operate on your sense of outrage. The question is what was a reasonable
expectation concerning security of tenure under the positive law in
existence. The answer to that question defines your interest. And, it
hardly seems outrageous to treat your interest precisely as the rules say
it will be treated. Maybe you, and other teachers, should have greater
security in your jobs. But surely that is a substantive policy issue for
legislative judgment.
Besides, the rules give you greater interests, both substantively and
procedurally, than the general law of this jurisdiction concerning em-
ployment contracts. Your definition of your interest of necessity relies
exclusively on the Board's rules. As Justice Rehnquist says, you have
to take the bitter with the sweet.25
Court (to Citizen): I am afraid he's right. I can't go around making up
new values or interests and then new procedures to protect them. That's
not my role.
Good luck in your job search.
Citizen: I think you've done it again-read the due process clause right
out of the Constitution.
Court: Next case.
The positivist trap does not catch all cases one way or another. Many
dance nimbly around the yawning steel maw without touching; 26 others
actuate the trigger mechanism for some Justices and not others. 27 Some
Justices even claim that positivism has no attraction for them and, perhaps,
no place in constitutional adjudication. 28
25 Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 153-54 (1974) (plurality opinion by Rehnquist,
J.).
26 Most due process cases provide opportunities for falling into one or the other of
the positivist traps. For cases in which the traps are somehow wholly avoided, see
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977).
27 Compare Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710-12 (1976) (majority opinion by
Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Stewart, Blackmun, and Powell, JJ.)
(reputational interest not a "liberty" or "property" interest protected by the due
process clause) with id. at 720-34 (dissenting opinion by Brennan, J., joined by
Marshall and White, JJ.) (reputational interest may be a "liberty" interest, and may
implicate "property" interests, protected by the due process clause).
28 The remarkable twists and turns of individual Justices in procedural due process
cases are worthy of a study in themselves. Perhaps the following will suffice to set the
1981]
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But, the judicial dilemma that gives the trap its lure remains. Without a
connection to positive law, the Justices must confront the freedom to assign
values to the interests demanding due process protection. And although that
essentially "natural law" posture-an attempt to derive principles from
axioms concerning the intrinsic nature of man or the inherent qualities of
liberal democracy-is sometimes feasible, even hospitable,2 9 a positivist
judicial retreat is often prudent.30 The question is how to prevent retreat
from becoming rout.
Herein lies one attraction of a dignitary theory of procedural due process.
A dignitary theory may avoid the positivist starting point. Such a theory can
quite appropriately view the question of the process claimant's substantive
interest as irrelevant to the question of his or her process rights. The issue is
instead whether the challenged process sustains or diminishes individual
dignity. The statutory or common-law characterization of the claimant's
interest, or its relative value as represented by the general pattern of positive
norms, is evidence of the existence and strength of dignitary values. But
these sources can hardly be definitive. The search from the dignitary
perspective is for constitutional fundamentals, not legislative contingencies.
There is, of course, an element of finesse here: the difficult problem of
delineating an appropriate judicial role in the determination of substantive
values is avoided by simply asserting that judicial definition of constitution-
ally significant dignitary concerns is the core function of due process adjudi-
cation. It remains to be seen whether dignitary theory can develop a persua-
sive case for that role. Persuasiveness will no doubt turn both on the degree
to which the values asserted to be dignitary values can be seen to be at the
tone: InBishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976), Justice White begins a dissent for himself
and Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun by saying, "I dissent because the
decision of the majority rests upon a proposition [the positivist trap] which was
squarely addressed and in my view correctly rejected by six Members of this Court in
Arnett v. Kennedy .... " Id. at 355 (White, J., dissenting). That statement implictly
criticizes Justice-Powell, who-although he was caught with the majority in
Bishop-rejected the lure of the trap in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 166-67
(1974) (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result in part).
Justice White and his Bishop companions should not, however, wax too self-
righteous. A look at New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96
(1978), reveals Justice White to have joined in a majority opinion written by Justice
Brennan that is so wedded to the positivist view that it cannot distinguish a pro-
cedural from a substantive issue. See 439 U.S. at 106-08. And Justice Blackmun
concurs in the classic Bishop v. Wood majority's style: "the abstract expectation of a
new franchise does not qualify as a property interest." 439 U.S. at 113 (Blackmun,
J., concurring). Meanwhile, Justice Stevens, who wrote the majority opinion in
Bishop, was the sole dissenter in Fox, on grounds that necessarily give independent
normative force to the words of the due process clause. See 439 U.S. at 114 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
29 See Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey
and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 334-63 (1957).
30 See Mashaw, supra note 4, at 49.
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core of traditional conceptions of liberal democracy, and on the degree to
which effectuation of those values through constitutional adjudication chal-
lenges contrary legislative judgments concerning legal process characteris-
tics. For as we shall see, the appropriateness of any judicial revision of
legislative judgments is a serious question in versions of liberal con-
stitutionalism that permit more than a minimal state. 3
C. A Broadened Perspective
Closely connected with the desire to avoid positivist snares is a desire to
broaden the range of due process inquiry. The dominant due process analy-
sis is instrumentalist as well as positivist. It takes the basic Benthamite
approach to legal procedure, viewing it as the means (or instrument) for
realizing the commands of the substantive law.3 2 The goodness of a proce-
dure is thus determined by assessing its capacity for accurate factfinding
and appropriate application of substantive legal norms to the facts as
found. 33 Claims to process protections become mediate or instrumentalist
claims to facilitating structures for the protection of substantive rights.
31 Suffice it to say that I find unpersuasive the escapes from positivist traps
suggested by Michelman, supra note 8, and by Tushnet, The Newer Property: A
Suggestion for the Revival of Substantive Due Process, 1975 Sup. CT. REV. 261,
277-86.
The former first suggests an allocation of roles between legislature and court-
substantive rights definition for the legislature, procedural rights definition for the
courts-which is premised on a supposed presupposition in the Supreme Court's
"implicit positivism" that holds that substantive rights can only perform their office
by setting bounds on zones of autonomy if procedures exist for their effective
implementation that are not themselves subject to legislative manipulation. Michel-
man, supra note 8, at 134. The Supreme Court (some Justices) may, indeed, (some-
times) hold this view, but it is hardly a coherent positivist position. Nor does it
explain what underlies the presupposition limiting the legislature's "legitimate pro-
vince." Michelman's later suggestion that fake or quasi-entitlements are sometimes
found when the Court wants to require procedures in cases in which actual positive
entitlements cannot be claimed, id. at 145-48, may again be a way of describing the
dominant jurisprudence, but it similarly avoids the critical question: "What justifies
an assertion of judicial power to constitutionalize administrative procedure?" (As
further reading will reveal, I nevertheless think Michelman's analysis leads in a
generally appropriate direction.)
Tushnet faces the problem squarely, recognizing that the issue is one of defining
constitutional liberties. But the methodology he suggests is so wide-ranging-he calls
it the "criteria of social importance'--that it belies his earlier claim to embrace
substantive due process without Lochnerian excess. Tushnet, supra, at 277-80. (For
my own attempt at the same game, see Mashaw, Constitutional Deregulation: Notes
Toward a Public, Public Law, 54 TUL. L. REV. 849 (1980)).
32 See generally Postema, The Principle of Utility and the Law of Procedure:
Bentham's Theory of Adjudication, 11 GA. L. REV. 1393, 1401-02 (1977).
33 See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 343-47; Mashaw, supra note 4, at 39-45.
1981]
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There is no obvious reason, however, why people should be more con-
cerned with protecting their process rights in regard to existing substantive
entitlements, than with protecting their participation in the processes by
which substantive entitlements are defined.3 4 Yet, the Supreme Court has
ostentatiously denied that it is concerned, when interpreting the due process
clause, with judging the appropriateness of the processes of legislative or
quasi-legislative lawmaking, save as they approach the adjudicative mode.
35
As contemporary administrative activity-particularly administrative
regulation-moves increasingly toward the use of generally applicable
rules, 36 a due process jurisprudence oriented to the protection of rights
through adjudication, rather than toward the ways in which rights are
created by quasi-legislative processes, appears impoverished. If the Court is
to have anything constitutionally significant to say about the shape of mod-
ern administrative processes, a positivist-instrumentalist approach, focused
on accurate application of existing legal rules, will not suffice. The image of
the modern administrative state generating increasing numbers of inevitably
arbitrary general rules, unconstrained by any operationally relevant con-
stitutional theory of democratic individualism, is unsettling. It is certainly
enough to motivate a search for some alternative perspective on administra-
tive due process.
D. A Promise of Constitutional Coherence
Yet, the problem of the sense of injustice that may emerge from the
application of uniform rules to arguably diverse individuals has not always
elicited the response that constitutional due process is unconcerned with
general rules. Indeed, this sense of injustice and concern with general
rulemaking is at the base of a seemingly eclectic series of due process cases
that enunciate the so-called "irrebuttable presumption" doctrine. These
cases occurred in two flurries,37 emerging and disappearing, some might say,
34 See generally Cooper, Goldberg's Forgotten Footnote: Is There a Due Process
Right to a Hearing Prior to the Termination of Welfare Benefits When the Only Issue
Raised is a Question of Law?, 64 MINN. L. REV. 1107 (1980); Comment, Due
Process Rights of Participation in Administrative Rulemaking, 63 CALIF. L. REV.
886 (1975).
15 See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 542 & n.16 (1978).
36 See generally Fuchs, Development and Diversification in Administrative
Rulemaking, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 83 (1977).
17 Among the first flurry are Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932); Hoeper v.
Tax Comm'n, 284 U.S. 206 (1931); Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230 (1926).
Among the second flurry are Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974);
United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973); Vlandis v. Kline,
412 U.S. 441 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S.
535 (1971). For recent cases upholding general, uniform administrative rules, see
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976); Mourning v. Family Publications Serv.,
Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973).
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like a recurrent plague of locusts-for the irrebuttable presumption doctrine
has a voracious appetite for statutes. 38 It states, in its boldest form, that
statutes (or administrative rules) may employ no proxy categories; that
every statutory classification equating some objective characteristic of per-
sons with some goal of public policy must be universally appropriate. If
there are real-world exceptions that would, under the challenged statutory
scheme, be treated like the rule, the statute establishes an illicit, irrebuttable
presumption-a violation of due process of law. 39 That violation is remedi-
able only by the provision of opportunities for individualized judgments
concerning the fit between specific persons or occasions and the goals of
public policy.40
There are two obvious problems with the irrebuttable presumption ap-
proach. First, it contradicts a massive jurisprudence affirming the expe-
diency and desirability of substituting transparent general rules for individ-
ualized adjudication. 41 Second, if left long at large, the doctrine would gnaw
its way through most of the United States Code, not to mention state
statutes, municipal ordinances, and the regulations of most administrative
agencies. Attractive largely because of its apparent value neutrality, the
principle has no obvious limits. It is a formalistic principle; empty no doubt,
but on its way to becoming full.
To have limits, the irrebuttable presumption doctrine must have content,
and a dignitary approach may point the way. The notion that the doctrine
represents is after all not a trivial concern: legislative or administrative
generalizations that ignore personal and situational differences, that tend to
stamp out individuality, may be harmful indeed. The question, of course, is,
"How much of this kind of assault on individual personality is bearable?"
The formalistic irrebuttable presumption doctrine implicitly answers
"none," and, thereby, signals the practical necessity for its periodic return
to dormancy. A dignitary theory that sought to articulate, defend, and
effectuate a process-oriented conception of procedural due process might
discover, in its quest for the core conditions of individual dignity, principles
also applicable to rule-making processes that could properly limit individual
demands for particularized official responsiveness. 42
38 See Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87
HARV. L. REV. 1534, 1548-49 (1974).
19 Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 446-54 (1973); Note, supra note 38, at 1534.
40 That is the strict view. In at least one "irrebuttable presumption" case, how-
ever, the Court allowed that a more limited presumption than the one at bar might
have been permissible, even without providing for individualized determinations.
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 647 n.13 (1974).
41 See, e.g., Weinberger v. Hynson, Wescott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609,
623-26 (1973), and cases cited therein.
42 For other attempts to deal with this issue, see Mashaw, Conflict and Compro-
mise Among Ideals of Administrative Justice, 1981 DUKE L.J. 181; Tribe, Perspec-
tives on Bakke: Equal Protection, Procedural Fairness, or Structural Justice?, 92
HARV. L. REV. 864 (1979); Tribe, Structural Due.Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 269 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Structural Due Process].
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A dignitary approach may promote a new constitutional coherence in
another way. There is a sense in which only a dignitary theory promises to
make procedural due process judgments consistent, both'with the individ-
ualist presuppositions of the Bill of Rights, and with the modem substan-
tive due process jurisprudence that has emerged from a combination of Bill
of Rights texts with fourteenth amendment due process. 43 The fifth amend-
ment's due process clause is, after all, in the original Bill of Rights-a set of
protections concerned preeminently with the liberal ideal of individual free-
dom from majoritarian excess. An approach to procedural due process
questions that is positivist in its starting points, instrumentalist in its basic
inquiry, and "interest balancing" or utilitarian in its evaluative technique
wrenches the due process clause from its constitutional context. The possi-
bility that positive law will be oppressive-that the perception of the general
good, or the "public interest," will overwhelm individual rights-describes
the need for the Bill of Rights protections. General utility cannot be the
measure of those protections as well. Yet that is precisely what the domi-
nant constitutional theory maintains as it weighs the benefits of increased
accuracy against the costs of procedural formality.
44
A dignitary perspective thus holds out the prospect of returning pro-
cedural due process to the family of individualistic concerns that are rep-
resented by constitutional values such as privacy, free expression and reli-
gious freedom. It would also connect up the methodology of procedural due
process-a search for fundamental dignitary values-with the value matrix
that finds substantive due process expression in the fourteenth amendment's
incorporation doctrine. 45 It would, in sum, reconcile procedural due process
analysis with the spirit of the Constitution.
II. THE CHALLENGE OF A DIGNITARY PERSPECTIVE
That dignitary approaches to due process analysis have intuitive appeal,
respond to contemporary concerns about a burgeoning administrative state,
and tantalize us with the prospect of a nonpositivist, yet coherent and
satisfying, constitutional theory may propel our inquiry; but it still leaves us
far short of an account of what such a theory would propose, how it can be
justified, and how it would work itself out in an evolving due process
jurisprudence. Indeed, dignitary theorizing may fail at any of these points:
(1) It may not be possible to elaborate a plausible set of "process values."
(2) If elaborated, these values may fail of satisfactory justification. (3) Even
if given a principled and coherent justification, the set of "validated" pro-
cess values may yet fail us in application. On the one hand, a dignitary
approach might go too far: a robust value matrix might demand more of
43 See generally Mashaw, supra note 31; Tushnet, supra note 31.
44 See generally Note, supra note 6.
45 See generally Henkin, 'Selective Incorporation" in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 73 YALE L.J. 74 (1963).
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administrative government than a world of scarce resources cares to admit,
but not generate any internal principles of self-limitation. On the other hand,
a dignitary approach might not go far enough: the set of plausible and
justifiable values that can be forced into the mold of an adjudicable constitu-
tional complaint might appear anemic in comparison with the issues that an
elaborate due process jurisprudence confronts. Here again, dignitary theory
would have proved inadequate to the task. In this section, therefore, I shall
attempt to elaborate and justify a set of plausible "process values." In
Section III, I shall discuss their application.
A. Intuitive Statement
There are more calls 46 for the abandonment of "positivist," "utilitarian,"
or "instrumentalist" perspectives and the construction of a dignitary con-
stitutional theory (or for the elaboration of dignitary values) than there are
taxonomie s, 47 much less extended defenses, of the process concerns that
would inform such a due process jurisprudence. Yet, whether considering
the literature, or viewing the question as opening up wholly virgin territory,
the generation of a plausible group of dignitary-value candidates seems
within our grasp. We can initially derive our proposed values intuitively, for
they are rooted in common characteristics of liberal constitutionalism. A
brief exploration of the prime candidates reveals, however, the need to
pursue these intuitions in greater depth. The values that fit our intuitions are
vague at the margins and potentially contradictory at the core. They only
begin to adumbrate a usable constitutional theory. My candidates for a
taxonomy of dignitary values follows.
1. Equality
The demand that the techniques for making collective decisions not imply
that one person's or group's contribution (facts, interpretation, policy argu-
ment, etc.) is entitled to greater respect than another's merely because of the
identity of the person or group is so ubiquitous and intuitively plausible that
no extended defenses of equality's candidacy seems appropriate. Yet, equal-
ity is a notoriously slippery concept, and its procedural implications are
puzzling.
First, the idea of equal respect and equal voice is strongly associated
with majority rule: May's theorem demonstrates that if all persons are
permitted to participate in all decisions under conditions that ensure that no
one's identity or preferred outcomes have special status and that each
person has an equal chance to cast the decisive vote, then only majority rule
46 E.g., Michelman, supra note 8; Saphire, supra note 5; Summers, supra note 10;
Van Alstyne, supra note 7; Note, supra note 6.
41 Summers and Saphire provide extended and overlapping taxonomies. Saphire,
supra note 5, at 114-25; Summers, supra note 10, at 20-27. Michelman limits his
candidates to "revelation" and "participation." Michelman, supra note 8, at 127.
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can emerge as the decision rule.4 8 Any decision of the type we are discus-
sing, imposing procedures contrary to those arrived at in the majoritarian
political process, accordingly carries some anti-egalitarian stigma, even if it
is premised on egalitarian concerns. The notion of equal respect cannot,
therefore, carry us in a straightforward deductive fashion toward constitu-
tional due process rules applicable to nonvoting contexts. The development
of such rules must proceed prudentially from a concern with majoritarian
tyranny .49
Second, building decisional processes that protect equality in a prudential
fashion is quite difficult. Formal and substantive equality often compete.
The ability of both sides in a conventional adversary dispute to question a
witness seems essential to formal equality. Yet, such questioning may so
increase the costs of litigation to certain parties-rape victims or malpractice
defendants, for example-that they appear substantively disadvantaged.
Weighted voting rules (constitutional amendments), 50 special proof re-
quirements (beyond a reasonable doubt), 51 presumptions (workmen's com-
pensation coverage),52 or one-sided appeal structures (criminal trials, public
benefits decisions), 3 may have at their base some notion of redressing
substantive inequality.
Indeed, the simple dynamics of processes may subtly advantage or disad-
vantage certain types of claims or claimants. Oral adjudicatory process, for
example, may be a more powerful technique for exposing weaknesses, gaps,
or uncertainties concerning a proposed decision than for portraying the
general scientific or common sense notions that would support it. Yet, the
even-handed, formal elimination of orality, or of cross-examination, or of
48 May, A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple
Majority Decision, 20 ECONOMETRICA 680, 683 (1952). My text provides a very free
rendering of May's conditions. His proof is much more accessible in A. SEN,
COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 71-73 (1970).
'9 See generally B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 301-13
(1980).
10 The United States Constitution requires that constitutional amendments be
ratified by three-fourths of the states, rather than a simple majority. U.S. CONST. art.
V.
11 The due process clause requires that no person be convicted of a criminal
offense unless every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged is proved beyond
a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
52 Some workmen's compensation statutes establish presumptions that employ-
ees' claims fall within their provisions. 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION § 10.33, at 3-120 (1978).
13 At least under federal law, the one-sided criminal appeal structure may be
crumbling somewhat: the current trend appears to allow government appeals
whenever the Constitution permits. See United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 337
(1975); 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976).
For an example in the public benefits arena, see the Social Security Act § 205(g), 42
U.S.C.A. § 405(g) (Supp. 1981).
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the plodding, serial presentation of evidence normally associated with ad-
judication, may reverse substantive inequalities, rather than redress an
imbalance.
Finally, we should note both the extended domain and the potentially
limited power of process equality. The domain of equality concerns reaches
well beyond majority voting and adversary adjudication. Even in investiga-
tory adjudicative processes formally involving only one party (for example,
public assistance claims), we would be concerned that each person affected
by a decision have equal effort (formal? substantive?) devoted to the ac-
cumulation of evidence and consideration of its import. For to do otherwise
is to deny that one person's claim to the same subject matter is as valuable as
another's. We may similarly be concerned about equal access to representa-
tive legislators, or to the legislative process, notwithstanding the admitted
connection of the legislative process to majoritarian voting processes.
Within this extensive domain, however, equality may be a thin protection.
If we provided everyone confronting any administrative decision with the
process made available to K in The Trial, 54 equality would be maintained,
but the protection afforded individual self-respect would be modest indeed.
2. Predictability, Transparency, and Rationality
It seems obvious, building on the last remark, that predictability, transpar-
ency, and rationality are a family of related process values that can make a
worthwhile contribution to any process participant's sense of self-respect."5
The hallmark of a-decisional process that can be described as "Kafkaesque"
is the participants' befuddlement. They know only that they seem to be
involved in an important decision concerning their lives. But they have no
idea what is relevant to the decision, who will make it, and, in the extreme
case, what precisely the decision is about. Perhaps the only thing that
becomes clear in such a process is that if and when a decision is made, the
participants will not be given any understandable reasons for it.
"Kafkaesque" procedures take away the participants' ability to engage in
rational planning about their situation, to make informed choices among
options. The process implicitly defines the participants as objects, subject to
infinite manipulation by "the system." To avoid contributing to this sense of
alienation, terror, and ultimately, self-hatred, a decisional process must give
participants adequate notice of the issues to be decided, of the evidence that
is relevant to those issues, and of how the decisional process itself works. In
the end, there must also be some guarantee, usually by articulation of the
basis for the decision, that the issues, evidence, and processes were in fact
meaningful to the outcome.5 6 This reasongiving is necessary, both to redeem
54 F. KAFKA, THE TRIAL (W. Muir & E. Muir trans., E. Bulter rev. 1970).
ss When I refer to the "participants" in a decision-making process, I do not mean
the decisionmaker, only the subjects of the decision and, perhaps, other contributors
to the process.
56 Robert Summers has reached a similar conclusion in a discussion that appears
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prior promises of rationality, and to provide guidance for the individual's
future planning. In its latter aspect reasongiving confirms the participant,
even in the face of substantive disappointment, as engaging in an ongoing
process of rational and self-regarding action.
Although these general remarks concerning this group of dignitary de-
mands may appear to raise few problems, we should be clear about some of
the questions that remain. Although random and unstructured processes
obviously limit the purposiveness of participation and inhibit rational plan-
ning concerning other affected aspects of a participant's life, we sometimes
prefer them to rigidly structured decisional rules. They emphasize the
"human"--meaning perhaps the emotional, eclectic, and intuitive-aspects
of our personality. Opportunities to be engaged in predictable ways in
purposive activity do not always increase our sense of self-worth. Certain
familiar and apparently rational legal processes-e.g., juries and hospital
"God" committees-not only fail to give reasons, but are valued because
they do not.
5 7
A conflict may lurk somewhere between two aspects of our individuality:
rationality and freedom. And this conflict might be redescribed as a conflict
between different notions of rationality: "rationality" as an intuitive process
in which goals, means of achieving them, and states of the world constantly
interact, each thereby reshaping our perceptions of the others; or a paradigm
of means-ends "rationality" in which goals, at least, are fixed, coherent, and
unambiguous. A demand that a process be "rational" thus does not define




"Participation" is an obvious candidate for our set of dignitary process
values. One constantly confronts the claim that the dignity and self-respect
to draw on, without expressly mentioning, dignitary values. See Summers, supra
note 10, at 26-27.
57 G. CALABRESI & P. BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICEs 57-62 (1978).
58 Moreover, we must beware of demanding the impossible in the name of the
rational. Kenneth Arrow's general possibility theorem, when applied to administra-
tive decisionmaking, indicates that under certain circumstances "rationality" in any
sense may be unattainable. Suppose we chartered an administrative agency to regu-
late by license, permit, or order some potentially harmful behavior. Suppose further
that we gave the agency a series of "values" to "consider" in arriving at its
judgments, and required it to render reasoned judgments in the "public interest."
Arrow's theorem introduces into this familiar scenario the unfamiliar notion that if a
small set of conditions is used to define what "consideration" and "the public
interest" entail-conditions so minimal that they can be expected to produce univer-
sal assent-then the agency will be unable to produce consistent decisions, and its
attempts at reasongiving will reveal it to be confused, devious, or both. See generally
Spitzer, Multicriteria Choice Preferences: An Application of Public Choice Theory to
Bakke, The FCC and the Courts, 88 YALE L.J. 717 (1979); Spitzer, Radio Formats by
Administrative Choice, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 647 (1980).
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of the individual can be protected only through processes of government in
which there is "meaningful participation" by affected interests.5 9 Indeed, in
my statement of process "equality," I often described such equality as
equality of "participation," and I described processes as predictable, trans-
parent, or rational "for their participants."
The basis for a connection between participation and self-respect may,
however, be variously explained. As our positivist-trap dialogue suggested,
it has become traditional in the due process jurisprudence to make the
connection only in circumstances in which the individual is attempting to
defend some previously recognized "right. ' 60 That is arguably a dignitary
approach, but with a substantive entitlements trigger. 61 Yet, others would
assert that participation is equally important in proceedings that function
to develop the content of rights, rather than merely to enforce rights pre-
viously specified. 62 The latter claim-and it seems a persuasive one-may
be said to be that our self-respect is called into question not only when
our rights are dealt with in proceedings to which we are not admitted, but
also when we are excluded from a process of social decisionmaking in which
the set of rights we all hold are defined or elaborated.
This point is extended by those who argue that the true relationship
between participation and self-respect is that participation increases self-
respect to the degree that participation gives the participant control over the
process of decisionmaking. 63 And loss of control, it is argued, is particularly
damaging to self-respect precisely in those circumstances in which rights are
amorphous and decisionmaking depends importantly on "contextualizing"
the events or norms that appear to be relevant to the issue to be decided. It is
in these situations that we are especially conscious of the need to explain and
justify our actions and in which the loss of the opportunity to do so denies
our self-worth. Indeed, the argument is pressed further still to urge the
necessity of employing broad principles and contextualizing processes if we
are to avoid inducing perceptions of injustice and loss of individual status. 64
Now, obviously, in this form the participatory demand has very important
implications for the structure of substantive entitlements, although unlike
more extreme positivist positions it does not condition participation on the
assertion or defense of a well-specified substantive right. If this is the
direction in which a dignitary approach pushes the conceptualization of
59 See, e.g., E. REDFORD, DEMOCRACY IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 197
(1969).
60 See notes 21-28 and accompanying text supra.
61 Michelman, supra note 8, at 129-30. In fact, as we shall see, entitlements
triggers might well protect dignitary concerns, provided that the entitlements concep-
tion is appropriately robust. See section III B 2 infra.
62 E.g., Comment, supra note 34, at 898 & n.47.
63 Such "control" theorists often do not, however, necessarily link control and
self-respect. See note 15 supra.
64 See Thibaut & Walker, supra note 11, at 553-54; Structural Due Process, supra
note 42, at 303-06.
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process, then there are equally obvious difficulties in structuring constitu-
tional adjudication of process rights around such a notion. The demands for
participation begin to look like a demand that the administrative state be
dismantled, 65 and that all decisions instead be made by some combination of
popular referendum, adversary adjudication, and negotiation to consensus.
The demand for participation might, indeed, be more modest if separated
entirely from an entitlements conception, whether substantive entitlements
are viewed as rule-bound and static or principled and emergent. Such treat-
ment of the participatory demand characterizes what Frank Michelman
describes as "nonformal" processes, which evidence a human and moral
concern. 66 In his view, processes might pursue associational aims of which
participation, having a "part in the decision," is one. 67 Yet, although he
describes this fraternal or communal ideal in ways that are intuitively plausi-
ble and attractive, Michelman despairs of converting ideals into rights:
[A]n official whose explanations and interchanges have been re-
quisitioned by someone who assertedly owns those elements of his
behavior just will not be engaging in the kinds of acts which carry the
interpersonal meanings that (possibly) we yearn for. If such a thing as a
right to nonformalistic due process is conceivable, it must be a right of a
sort of which we (or I) do not now have an adequate idea, a right
existing outside the formalistic-positivist framework, a claim or drive or
value having a mandatory quality, yes, but not ultimately dependent
upon judicial coercion .... 68
In short, to rethink participatory process rights in terms that make them
meaningful at the level of self-definition or in terms of the desire for commu-
nity may be, necessarily, to render them nonjusticiable.
4. Privacy
The intuition that privacy matters, that processes that protect privacy are
better than those that do not, is reinforced by the few specific process
protections embodied in the American Constitution-the protections against
self-incrimination 69 and unreasonable searches. 70 In attempts to provide a
coherent framework for other more substantive constitutional protections-
protections surrounding procreative choices 7' and the marital relationship 72
65 Cf. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1980) (arguing
that traditional liberalism, hostile to the exercise of power by entities intermediate
between state and individual, has led to an undue diminishment of the legal power
granted cities).
66 Michelman, supra note 8, at 127-28.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 149-50.
69 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
70 Id. amend. IV.
71 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
72 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
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-the Supreme Court has identified these specific process constraints with
the more general notion of protecting privacy. 7 3 Privacy, perhaps more than
any of our other candidates, has the jurisprudential advantage of some
explicit instances of implementation.
But privacy raises rather different process concerns than the values previ-
ously canvassed in our intuitive taxonomy. Rationality and participation
seem to demand additions to public decision processes-additions that will
communicate and include, that will permit interchange, self-revelation, per-
haps mutual understanding. And, although strictly speaking equality of
citizens with respect to public decisions may imply only majority rule,
egalitarian, concerns carry in our constitutional vernacular connotations of
inclusion that make equality claims devices for demanding more extensive
access to existing processes.
7 4
Privacy, on the other hand, is at base a demand to be let alone, to be
respected as an autonomous being with legitimate claims to separateness.
Moreover, if process rights are of the usual Hohfeldian sort-that is, they
imply a duty 7 5-then surely privacy will sometimes conflict with participa-
tion, rationality, even equality. If my demand on you is for participation or
revelation, then your duty is certainly inconsistent with maintaining your
"right" to privacy. Indeed, I may well seek simultaneously to join you in a
process of collective decisionmaking, yet to shield through privacy claims
information that you deem highly pertinent to the correct resolution of our
dispute. Many common rules of procedure and evidence seem to have this
double aspect.7 6 What conception of personhood can mediate this clash
among dignitary values?
5. Residual Categories
Intuitive statement of variations on the process implications of human
dignity could go on. But I sense that we are nearing the point at which new
73 Id. at 384-85 (1978); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965).
74 This becomes most clear in the areas of criminal process protections, see, e.g.,
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (requiring the states to provide counsel
for indigent criminal defendants), and prisoners' rights, see, e.g., Bounds v. Smith,
430 U.S. 817 (1977) (requiring prison authorities to supply inmates with law libraries
or legal assistance). It is also reflected in the fifteenth and nineteenth amendments,
which proscribe the denial of suffrage on the basis of race or sex. U.S. CONST.
amends. XV & XIX.
75 See W. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS As APPLIED IN JUDI-
CIAL REASONING, AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS 36-38 (1919).
76 For example, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow broad pretrial discov-
ery, but enable the subjects of such discovery to move for protective orders in cases
of "annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense." FED. R.
Clv. P. 26(c). A prevailing rule of evidence proscribes the circumstantial use of
character evidence in most trial situations. E.g., FED. R. EvID. 404 & Advisory
Committee Note.
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characterizations of the theme can be reduced rather easily to one or a
combination of prior value categories. Thus, while I am attracted by addi-
tional formulations, such as "humaneness," 7 7 "individualization," or "ap-
propriate symbolism," I am suspicious that they are largely proxies for
combinations of values already declared. This is not, of course, to argue that
further attempts at intuitive statement are useless. Combination is not mere
repetition. It may provoke a synthesis of value attributes that would oth-
erwise remain obscure. I might, after all, have been satisfied to leave the
intuitive statement at the level of a demand for autonomy and fraternity, or
somewhat less abstractly for rights to self-legislation, comprehension, and
self-definition. Thus, further thought in this area might be fruitful.
Yet, for now, it seems sensible to view the exercise in intuitive taxonomy
as at an end. If it has convinced the reader that something prima facie
plausible can be said for a dignitary approach, its purpose has been served.
Whether you are quite satisfied with the list or with the precise formulation
of or nomenclature for the values posited, the values can nevertheless serve
as landmarks, hopefully sufficient, to prevent our inquiries into justification
and implementation from becoming aimless wanderings among either
abstract philosophical, or particular procedural, systems.
B. Theoretical Defense
But there are obviously some problems with our intuitions. The values
enunciated do not have very definite shapes; they are sometimes internally
contradictory, and they may be competitive. These features make them
appear, at least superficially, to be poor candidates for constitutional im-
plementation through the due process clause. Are the values merely to be
asserted as desirable and attractive, eclectically developed in contingent
contexts, and balanced against each other (and perhaps other values) in a
continuingly intuitive fashion? If so, then they are likely to be as fragile as
the dignitary protections already provided incidentally by the dominant
Benthamite approach. And one really cannot hope to constitutionalize val-
ues through intuitive assertion.
Some theoretical defense must be offered for translating moderately plaus-
ible intuitive claims into constitutional rights. Such a theory should define
the core of our dignitary concerns, connect that core in a coherent fashion to
a broader constitutional tradition, and point the way toward the means for
practical implementation of dignitary values in the structuring of due process
requirements. Can such a theory be devised? I think it can. Indeed, there are
several paths toward theoretical justification. None of the paths is, the
reader should be warned, simultaneously nonpositivist, noninstrumentalist
and nonutilitarian. Nor do they finally converge. Yet they traverse a com-
mon theoretical terrain and have points of tangency. They can lead us
17 Robert Summers employs this formulation. Summers, supra note 10, at 23.
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forward in our quest for a dignitary theory, while helping us to rethink and
redescribe our proposed destination.
The moral and political theories that we might most appropriately employ
to refine, reject, or support our intuitive taxonomy of process values are a
family of theories that I will call "the liberal tradition." This tradition has at
its core the notion that individuals are the basic unit of moral and political
value. 78 It is particularly in this tradition that limiting government by provid-
ing individual rights makes sense; and it is, of course, this intellectual
tradition that has been most influential both at the formation and in the
history of the American republic.
79
But "liberalish" theories are not all alike. We may exclude Platonic
idealism and Marxist materialism, as essentially nonliberal and therefore
inappropriate to the American constitutional tradition, without getting very
far toward an understanding of what that tradition entails. Indeed, on closer
examination the intellectual tradition that might be called "liberal" has
several major strands or streams, no one of which has an exclusive claim to
our attention. Each is an attempt to render a coherent account of individual
rights, and each may to that degree inform our understanding of a dignitary
perspective or process. Each has both eighteenth century roots and modern
spokesmen, and each may, therefore, seek to inform a process of constitu-
tional adjudication that is oriented neither wholly to tradition nor wholly to
contemporary concerns.
1. The Liberal Tradition
A description of the liberal tradition that is a sufficiently short compass
to meet our present needs, yet in a form that avoids presenting merely a
cartoon, is no easy matter. Liberal ideas have emerged in social and political
contexts 80 from which they can be extracted only with substantial loss of
meaning. To describe the logic of liberalism is in some sense to falsify it.
81
Nevertheless, let me characterize the basic liberal moves as falling into
three ancestral categories-Lockean, Benthamite, and Kantian. We shall
discuss the first two very briefly, merely to demonstrate the possibility of
arriving at dignitary process values from these positions. But since the first
78 "Liberalism is the belief in and the commitment to a set of methods and policies
that have as their common aim greater freedom for individual men." Smith,
Liberalism, in 9 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 276, 276
(1968).
79 Thus, it hardly needs saying that both the Bill of Rights of the United States
Constitution and the declaration of the natural rights of man in the Declaration of
Independence embody such liberal notions.
80 And religious and juridical ones as well, see generally R. TUCK, NATURAL
RIGHTS THEORIES (1979).
81 See generally C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE
INDIVIDUALISM (1962).
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maintains little attraction for the modern liberal imagination82 and the sec-
ond has already been defined as the enemy by those seeking to extend the
conception of process values, 83 we need not tarry long. The Kantian tradi-
tion will receive more extended treatment, both because of its intuitive
connection with a dignitary approach to process and because John Rawls'
Kantian political theory84 has had a powerful influence on contemporary
legal thought.
(a) Locke and the Entitlements Conception. That some variation of
Locke's ideas, at least as embodied in a general Whig conception of gover-
nance, 85 influenced the structure of constitutionalism in America seems
beyond cavil. But there is imbedded in Lockean political theory a deep
contradiction between individual proprietorship over life, liberty, and prop-
erty and majoritarianism-a contradiction that is resolvable in two ways. 86
The first is to choose majoritarianism, a choice that we have previously
noted is strongly connected to the dignitary ideal of equal respect. 87 But this
move also entails a commitment to positivism and to just those revelatory
and associational processes generated by majoritarian governance.
The alternative approach emphasizes entitlement. In this view, as Robert
Nozick has recently reinterpreted it, persons and property emerge with
"rights" attached. 8 Given that such rights have a possessive character and
are attached to particular individuals, society has no claim on individually
held property or liberty. To Nozick, taxation is theft.89 He, therefore, views
even a minimal or guardian state only as an undesirable but inevitable
response to individual insecurity. 90 In his view, the state has no positive
(redistributive) functions, because such functions would necessarily invade
the rights of individuals. 91 Its only role is to protect individual liberty and
acquisitions.
82 Robert Nozick's recent work, e.g., R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA
(1974), may be the first serious attempt to defend a Lockean natural rights view of
property since the turn of this century.
83 See Mashaw, supra note 4, at 47-49; Saphire, supra note 5, at 148-51; Note,
supra note 6, at 1523-27.
84 J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
85 See generally B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REV-
OLUTION 22-54 (1967); G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC,
1776-1789, at 3-45 (1969).
86 Not counting the way Locke seems to have resolved it-that is, to so restrict
membership in political society and so limit the view of rational self-interest that
majority rule becomes the device, and only the device, by which the general scheme,
as well as property and its accumulation, is protected. See C.B. MACPHERSON, supra
note 81, at 251-62.
87 See notes 48-49 and accompanying text supra.
88 R. NozICK, supra note 82, at 10-25.
89 See id. at 169-70.
90 See id. at 10-25, 118.
9 See id. at 149-275. Nozick does not consider the provision of protective services
for some constitutents by others-the baseline requirement of his minimal state-
necessarily to be redistributive. Id. at 114-15.
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In this radical libertarian perspective it seems logical to presume that
procedures for dispute resolution would be easily classified as either legiti-
mate or illegitimate. Legitimate procedures would include only those that
could be seen to produce no errors (and therefore invaded no one's substan-
tive rights) 92 or that had been agreed to by a process of free negotiation
among the affected parties. 93 Both types of legitimate process protect auton-
omy. The former emphasizes rationality, the latter participation. Here are
dignitary processes in a robust form. Yet, because either type of legitimate
procedure is often unavailable or extremely expensive, the practical difficul-
ties of a radical libertarian conception of process seem overwhelming.
Nozick tells a metaphorical tale concerning the growth of a minimal state
(including machinery for dispute resolution) that attempts to avoid the
necessity (and obvious impracticability) of individual consent to all pro-
cedural arrangements by invoking the "invisible hand" of "voluntary"
association. 94 But in this metaphor voluntariness breaks down, if not
everywhere, at critical points. At the very least Nozick's explanation of
state sovereignty, the final unification of competing "protective agencies,"
is a pure power play based on social necessity. 95
But the convinced libertarian cannot readily relinquish his insistence on
consent in the face of social necessity. Once the necessities of social order
are admitted, there is no obvious theoretical stopping point when trading off
the claims of individual liberty against the demands of social necessity;
thereafter, argument is merely about the facts. And given the reinterpreta-
tion of liberalism in this century to emphasize the social preconditions for
meaningful exercise of individual rights, 96 if the libertarian wishes to retain a
natural entitlements posture, he had better hold fast to the demand for
individual consent to processes that can coercively rearrange rights. Oth-
erwise he moves rapidly back toward a positivist conception of substantive
entitlements and procedural rights. This is the land of Charles Reich's "New
Property, ' 97 a land that William Van Alstyne has shown to be heavily mined
with positivist traps. 98
Even were we to accept the Nozickian vision of substantive entitlements,
it is clear that dignitary processes in his system are merely the means for
protecting substantive rights. Processes do not exist for their own sakes, to
protect their own unique values. This particular brand of instrumentalism,
thus, makes a robust set of dignitary process rights hinge on acceptance of
the natural rights theory that leads to the minimal state. And I am doubtful
that the right to participation in markets is what those in quest of dignitary
rights in public processes of governance have in mind.
92 Id. at 106.
93 See id. at 101-02.
91 Id. at 118-19.
91 See id. at 108-10. Nozick describes this event as the inevitable development of a
"de facto monopoly." Id. at 109.
96 See, e.g., J. DEWEY, LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL ACTION (1935).
97 Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
98 Van Alstyne, supra note 7, at 452-70.
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(b) Bentham, Mill, and Utility. 99 It is tempting to exclude utilitarianism as
inconsistent with the individualist starting point of dignitary or liberal
theory. The utilitarian, after all, asks not, "What right do individuals
have?," but, "What maximizes social welfare?" In some sense
utilitarianism is the antithesis of an individual rights perspective. But, on
reflection, the temptation to ignore utility-maximizing approaches should be
rejected. Utilitarians can be as concerned with the "happiness" induced by
process as with the benefits that flow from accurate results. Neither should
we reject utilitarianism out-of-hand because it demands a social accounting.
That accounting is, after all, one in which each individual counts as one: my
happiness is as important as yours, and vice versa. There is in the utilitarian
social welfare calculus strict equality of persons (indeed, so far as one can
tell, all sentient beings). Moreover, the calculation is in no sense meant to
suggest that society itself has an organic existence. By "social welfare" the
utilitarian means only the sum of individuals' welfare. Finally, as a matter of
intellectual history, it seems inappropriate to exclude the author of On
Liberty 00 from the liberal tradition, on the ground that he also wrote
Utilitarianism. 101
The question,- then, is what the utilitarian has to say about individual
rights. Or perhaps more aptly, to what extent can a utilitarian approach yield
a justification for individual rights? Within the general framework, there
seem to be three basic methods of approaching this problem. One is Mill's
method in On Liberty. The idea is to separate the individual and the social.
Within the sphere of individual thought and action, that is, thought and
action having no substantial consequences for other persons, calculations of
social welfare have no place.' 0 The individual is free to pursue his own
desires, however misinformed or repugnant. Only when he acts in society by
taking action affecting its members is he subject to constraint on the basis of
calculations of social welfare.
There are, of course, well-known objections to this move. The principal
one is the indeterminateness of the line between "individual" and "social"
action.103 Another is the absence of any justification, other than social
welfare, for drawing such a line.10 4 Note, however, that this approach does
99 The use of Bentham is figurative. Although he is now more familiar to us, the
eighteenth century roots of utilitarianism in American constitutionalism lead more
directly to others. See generally G. WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA (1978); see also B.
BAILYN, supra note 85; G. WOOD, supra note 85.
1 0 J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY (C. Shields ed. 1956) (1st ed. London 1859).
'0' J.S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM (S. Gorovitz ed. 1971) (1st ed. London 1863).
102 "The only part of the conduct of anyone for which he is amenable to society is
that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his indepen-
dence is, of right, absolute." J.S. MILL, supra note 100, at 13.
103 See K. BRITTON, JOHN STUART MILL 102-06 (2d ed. 1969).
104 Mill's notion of the inviolable private sphere, it has been argued, stems not
from social welfare calculations but from natural law theories. R. ANSCHUTZ, THE
PHILOSOPHY OF J.S. MILL 8-29 (3d ed. 1969). Because I am more interested here in
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yield at least a dignitary process restraint-some notion of individual privacy
that is beyond social invasion because it is necessary to social welfare. The
problem, of course, is that the "right" is so fragile that it might as well be
called an "interest"-which may later be balanced against others.
A more satisfying move toward generating protected individual rights is
made by the so-called "Rule Utilitarians." 105 Their basic argument is that
certain individual rights or protections so often maximize social welfare that
they should have the status of rules. The use of these rules, rather than de
novo social welfare calculations when making decisions, is believed to en-
hance overall welfare because the rules are likely to be wrong less often than
an unguided and contingent attempt to maximize social welfare.10 6 The
rules, of course, establish only prima facie rights. They may be overridden
by a convincing demonstration in particular cases that social welfare de-
mands an exception. Nevertheless, even prima facie rights, rights that
merely prevail when the social welfare calculation is uncertain, may be quite
robust in the face of pervasive uncertainty.
What sorts of rights should have the status of rules in a utilitarian moral
universe? Here, of course, there can be much disagreement, but surely the
rules must be few in number. Otherwise the basic features of utilitarianism
would be lost.' 0 7 Moreover, rules should be developed only when excep-
tions are thought to be rare and the conduct proscribed (or required) relates
directly and powerfully to the core notions of pleasure and pain.
A common example of a utilitarian rule might be a prohibition against
slavery. Although they are often attacked by nonutilitarians with the claim
that their moral stance permits even such abominations as slavery, modern
utilitarians have given a persuasive argument for rule utilitarianism in this
context. R.M. Hare, for example, in a recent article, 0 8 admits that he can
hypothesize a situation in which slavery would do more good than would the
abolition of slavery. 109 But he further argues that, try as he might, he cannot
construct a believable scenario for such an outcome."I0 Moreover, because
utilitarianism as a coherent body of thought than with peculiar wrinkles in the thought
of John Stuart Mill, this complication may be ignored.
10- This is not to say that rule utilitarianism is a better moral theory. For a recent
discussion of the difficulties with rule utilitarian approaches, see D. REGAN,
UTILITANIANISM AND CO-OPERATION 83-93 (1980).
106 See generally Harrod, Utilitarianism Revised, in 45 MIND 137 (new ser. 1936).
107 Rule utilitarianism has thus been severely criticized as undermining the central
notion of utilitarianism-that one must always act to maximize human happiness.
E.g., Smart, Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism, in THEORIES OF ETHICS 171 (P.
Foot ed. 1967); Stout, "But Suppose Everyone Did the Same," 32 AUSTRALASIAN J.
PHIL. 1 (1954) (offering a defense to this criticism).
108 Hare, What is Wrong With Slavery?, 8 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 103 (1979).
109 Id. at 109-17.
110 Id. at 118-21. Hare notes certain aspects of human nature-such as the ten-
dency of human beings to exploit those over whom they have absolute power-which
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the condition of slavery produces a reign of terror-the slave (having no
legal rights) lives in constant fear of pain from the master's caprice, neglect,
or vengefulness-a clear prohibition on slave status seems to Hare consis-
tent with a well-considered utilitarian position."1 '
The utilitarian might take a similar view of wholly arbitrary procedures. At
the limit, the state bureaucracy that combines general power with absolute
discretion becomes as the master to the slave. A reign of terror ensues. The
citizen lives in constant fear of pain, and any movement toward predictabil-
ity and transparency will produce substantial social welfare gains. The
Kafkaesque, total bureaucracy should clearly be proscribed.
But as one moves away from the limiting case, toward the types of
procedural issues normally confronted in American legal life, the place of
utilitarian rules becomes highly problematic. Bureaucracies as we know
them have limited jurisdictions, discernible (although sometimes vague and
conflicting) substantive policies, and relatively standardized procedures.
Uncertainty is not terror, and the possibilities for contingent justification of
limited discretion abound.
Here lies the domain of the third and dominant utilitarian methodology, an
unfettered social welfare calculation, with all the well-known difficulties
inherent in that intellectual exercise.'1 2 A calculation of costs and benefits
particularly concerned with the impact of process directly on the happiness
of affected persons, would, for example, remain concerned with the poten-
tially greater happiness to be had from allocating public resources to a
multitude of worthwhile ends other than procedural reform. This methodol-
ogy yields a priori no support for any particular process or process value. It
can say only that, ceteris paribus, processes should produce pleasure rather
than pain, or perhaps more likely, should cause as little pain as possible. It is
precisely the thinness of this "ruleless" protection that some contemporary
dignitary theorists find objectionable.
(c) Kant and Rawls. Thus far liberal theory has seemed to point the way
toward an anemic and fragile set of process rights-majority rule, privacy,
and nonarbitrariness. Revelatory and participatory process values have
emerged only as instrumental to the maintenance of substantive entitlements
in a minimal state, or from general considerations of social welfare. In
addition to their other weaknesses, neither of these latter approaches seem
to have defined man as a political actor in a fully satisfactory fashion. The
entitlements approach subsumed politics in the market and implied that
must "always, or nearly always, make slavery an intolerable condition." Id. at
119-20.
M Id. at 119-21.
112 See Urmson, Utilitarianism: The Philosophy, in 16 INTERNATIONAL ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 224, 225 (1968). This differs from the first
methodology in that it omits the first methodology's area of inviolable private action.
See notes 102-04 and accompanying text supra.
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liberty and human dignity are defined in economic terms."13 Utilitarianism
subsumed the right in the good. Even when it converted the pleasure
principle into a moral duty, it somehow fell short of demanding that we
recognize the moral integrity of others in addition to their right to pursue
their own happiness.114
The Kantian strand of the liberal tradition might be more satisfactory.
Kant's approach is a priori and categorical; it seeks to reveal the moral
imperatives imbedded in the structure of normative rationality, and thus
does not create illusory interests that can easily be balanced away. More-
over, the well-known second formulation of the basic Kantian moral com-
mand compellingly characterizes the core value of liberal thought, that each
person be treated as an end, never merely as a means." 5 Can this ideal
provide a basis for a dignitary approach to due process?
Edmund Pincoffs has suggested as much in a Nomos volume on Due
Process."16 He applies what he calls a "Kantian injunction" to the issue in
Board of Regents v. Roth 1 7 -whether a nonrenewed teacher on an expired
term contract is entitled, by virtue of the due process clause, to some kind of
" Cf. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980) (criticizing
contemporary "economic analysis of law" theorists for implying that social wealth is
a social value-i.e., a thing worth having for its own sake).
"I See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, supra note 49, at 100-03, 342-45.
115 A few words may be in order here concerning Kant's categorical imperative,
and the formulae Kant derived from it. In his attempt to explicate the groundwork of
morality, Kant formulated a basic moral command-i.e., a categorical imperative.
Against this command the morality of all subjective, individual principles of action
(in Kant's terminology, maxims) could be judged. Reasoning that only those maxims
are moral which a rational being could conceive as being valid bases of action for all
other rational beings, Kant stated his categorical imperative as follows: "Act only
according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become
a universal law." I. KANT, FOUNDATION OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 39 (L.
Beck trans. 1959) (1st ed. Riga 1785). In order to focus the categorical imperative's
application, Kant proceeded to reformulate it four ways: (1) "Act as though the
maxim of your action were by your will to become a universal law of nature." Id. (2)
"Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another,
always as an end and never as a means only." Id. at 47. (3) Act in accord with "the
idea of the will of every rational being as a will giving universal law.... [E]verything
must be done from the maxim of [the] will as one which could have as its object only
itself considered as giving universal laws." Id. at 50. (4) "Act as if [you], by [your]
maxim, [are] at all times a legislative member in the universal realm of ends.... [Alct
as if your maxim should serve at the same time as the universal law of all rational
beings." Id. at 57 (on the "realm of ends," see note 120 and accompanying text
infra). The reader should note that each of these formulations is really a restatement
of the basic imperative, and its equivalent in meaning, if not in focus.
116 Pincoffs, Due Process, Fraternity, and a Kantian Injunction, in DUE PROCESS,
NoMos XVIII, at 172 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1977).
117 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
19811
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explanation or hearing concerning his failure to have his contract renewed.
Listen as Pincoffs proceeds:
[I]f there are no very persuasive arguments why Roth should not be
given reasons, are there any arguments why he should-or are we to
leave it that it is just intuitively obvious that he is morally (even if not
legally) entitled to reasons? Are we to say that of course he should be
given reasons-and a chance to contest them-out of simple decency?
Or that in an ideal community he would be given reasons? Or that to
refuse to give him reasons and an opportunity to contest them would be
unthinkable? None of these remarks would be very helpful. None of
them gives reasons for the giving of reasons; all seem like ways of
avoiding the kind of account which must be given to those who are
impressed with the need for official efficiency, for getting on with
whatever the task may be.
Somewhat to my own surprise, I find that I am driven, in my analysis
of the moral rights and duties that obtain between Roth and his presi-
dent to the second formulation of the Kantian categorical imperative;
the formulation that commands us never to treat anyone-including
ourselves-as a mere means. Think of the Kantian command as being
justified and at the same time clarified by the examination of a number of
varying paradigms of treating persons as mere means to some end. One
paradigm that might be offered is precisely the case in hand. If the
president is assessed-and assesses himself-solely on grounds of his
efficiency in attaining the complex end of an adequate educational
opportunity for those who are qualified to take advantage of it, then he
regards himself as a mere means, and at the same time regards Roth and
his colleagues as mere means to the attainment of educational opportu-
nity .... [I]f Roth is not informed of his fault, he is treated as a mere
means; he is eliminated, like a faulty machine part, from an organization
that will henceforth, supposedly, function better without him, and in
that [sic] no further thought is given to Roth's interest in correcting his
own performance.
But [Roth's] being owed reasons is but a small distance-if it is any
distance-from his being owed a hearing in which he can examine, and
challenge, what is said by the president-in which he can participate in
the decision that concerns himself.
It is not necessary, then, to suppose that there is value in sheer
participation. Participation may be instrumentally valuable, but instru-
mental to the achievement of a moral purpose that is itself impossible to
describe in instrumental terms, the purpose of treating a man not as a
mere means but as an end in himself. This is not to say that there is no
intrinsic value in participation. I would prefer to say that there may be,
but that the moral value of participation turns on its relation to a moral
end. This relationship of instrumentality is not the same kind as that
between the president's raising money and educational opportunity for
all. We might say that participation is an instrument by which the
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valuation of persons as ends in themselves is expressed. It is as if the
Kantian principle were determinable in any number of ways, but par-
ticipation is one of the ways in which it may become determinate. It
does not follow that mere participation is of value (though it may have
value), but rather follows that participation is morally valuable to the
degree that it makes determinate the moral principle that we should
never treat a man as a mere means." 8
Now it is this type of reasoning from first principles of "human dignity" or
"moral integrity" that seems most likely to generate cognizable claims of
right within a dignitary theory of due process. As Pincoffs' analysis demon-
strates, extensive procedural demands may be justified by an argument
which includes consideration of prudential concerns for other social goals.
The direct application of the Kantian categorical imperative, in which dig-
nity may be said to consist in being treated as an end in oneself rather than as
instrumental to the ends of others, may thus yield a robust set of procedural
rights. Presumably, Roth may demand, as at least a Kantian moral right, a
process designed to preserve and enhance his particular goals in life.
The attempt to apply Kantian injunctions in the Pincoffsian fashion leads,
however, to an apparent contradiction. If frustrating Roth's process claims
by balancing them against resource constraints, and hence implicitly against
the claims or purposes of others, is a failure to treat Roth as an end in
himself, then Roth seems entitled legitimately to demand any process that he
deems necessary to the pursuit of his purposes in life. But what is to be said
to Roth's colleagues who object to spending their time pursuing Roth's
purposes? Are they not being used as mere means? May they not wield the
categorical imperative to demand privacy from Roth's incessant pursuit of
participatory governance? Where is the principle of limitation that would
adjust competing claims or ends?
The problem lies, I believe, in the use that Pincoffs makes of the second
formulation of the categorical imperative. The injunction to treat persons
always as ends in themselves is derived from the "universalization" re-
quirement of Kant's categorical imperative." 9 And like the basic impera-
tive, the second formulation must be read as related to an objective or
universal realm of "ends" or "moral persons."120 So construed, the injunc-
tion relates not to frustrating any person's goals or purposes in life, but to
1'8 Pincoffs, supra note 116, at 175-79.
'19 See note 115 supra.
120
[A]II rational beings stand under the law that each of them should treat himself
and all others never merely as means but in every case also as an end in himself.
Thus there arises a systematic union of rational beings through common objec-
tive laws. This is a realm which may be called a realm of ends (certainly only an
ideal), because what these laws have in view is just the relation of these beings to
each other as ends and means.
1. KANT, supra note 115, at 52. Kant adverts to the realm of ends expressly in his
fourth formulation of the categorical imperative. See note 115 supra.
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frustrating the person's exercise and development of a "good will."1 21 Each
person is thus an end-in-himself because each person participates in, or
strives for, objective moral goodness. The injunction to respect that partici-
pation or striving can-indeed should-be limited by some notion of which
actions or claims relate to the dignity of a rational being. 122 Other claims are
not "universal."
But if we have thus in theory rescued Kant from the incessant and
competitive claims of the self-realizing ego, we have not thereby specified a
determinate perspective on process claims. And, indeed, the rescue opera-
tion seems doomed. For when we put the question, "What is the good will
against which actions and claims are to be measured?," we get two equally
unhelpful answers. In the last part of the Foundations of the Metaphysics of
Morals, 123 and in the second Critique, 124 we seem to be told that the
kingdom of ends-the reality of the moral self rather than its historically
contingent appearance-lies always beyond our vision. 125 It is a conceptual
ideal necessary to explain the possibility of our notions of moral worth and
our striving for goodness, but it is not available for comparison with the
phenomenal world. The first answer thus says that our quest is inevitable,
but impossible.
The second answer comes from Kant's famous examples, the applications
of the categorical imperative. But this answer is unsatisfactory, because
these examples are famous nonsequiturs. For Kant, the requirement of
universalization of moral maxims excludes suicide, 126 and all lying, 127 while
it requires charity. 28 In one essay he even purports to derive rules of
etiquette at dinner parties from the categorical imperative. 29 But to Kant's
readers these "obvious" applications have always been troublesome.
1 30
121
Morality . . . consists in the relation of every action to that [individual,
personal] legislation through which alone a realm of ends is possible. This
legislation, however, must be found in every rational being. It must be able to
arise from his will, whose principle then is to take no action according to any
maxim which would be inconsistent with its being a universal law ....
I. KANT, supra note 115, at 52.
122 See id. at 50-52, 60-64.
123 Id.
124 I. KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON (L. Beck trans. 1956) (1st ed. Riga
1788).
125 See id. at 124-26; I. KANT, supra note 115, at 69-72.
126 I. KANT, supra note 115, at 39-40.
127 Id. at 40.
128 Id. at 41.
129 1. KANT, ANTHROPOLOGIE, PRAGMATICALLY CONSIDERED 185-91 (Dowdell
trans. 1978).
130 See, e.g.; C.D. BROOD, FIVE TYPES OF ETHICAL THEORY 129-31 (1934)
(arguing that Kant's examples do not illustrate his categorical imperative). For
sympathetic attempts to interpret Kant's moral thought and to explain the relation-
ship between its abstract principles and its concrete examples of moral duty, see, for
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They seem merely to dress up the conventional morality of eighteenth
century Konigsberg in philosophic costume.
In order to rescue Kant from the criticism that, in application, the categor-
ical imperative owes virtually everything to place, time, and person, and
almost nothing to objective theory, the first answer must be embraced. The
categorical imperative was not meant to be directly applicable to the phe-
nomenal world as a means for generating rules of conduct or moral claims.
Rather, it provides an ideal toward which the rules of the phenomenal world
can strive.
From this perspective the wisdom and subtlety of John Rawls' approach to
rendering Kant more determinate in his A Theory of Justice 13 1 is thrown into
sharp relief. The original position 132 might be viewed as an approach to the
kingdom of ends; the veil of ignorance 33 as a technique for protecting the
universal or good will from the clash of contingent purposes that punctuate
the phenomenal world. 134 The choices of the disembodied, rational wills
posited by Rawls are universal by definition, and the pursuit of the principles
of justice by a rational placeholder, who does not know where he will end up
in the social scheme, necessarily treats all rational beings as ends in them-
selves.
Rawls is, of course, more than incidentally committed to the satisfaction
of Kant's imperative.1 3 5 To treat anyone as a mere means is to deny the
importance of his ends in life and, at the same time, to undermine his basis
for self-respect. And in A Theory of Justice the idea of self-respect plays a
critical dual role. It is the intuitive bedrock upon which many of Rawls'
psychological assumptions about acceptable bargains will be based, and it is
also a test of the moral legitimacy and relative desirability of the principles
and institutions that emerge from the process of contracting.
136
As is by now generally familiar, from the original position of self-interested
neutrality Rawls generates two basic principles of justice. The first is a
example, M.J. GREGOR, LAWS OF FREEDOM (1963); H.J. PATON, THE CATEGORICAL
IMPERATIVE (1947).
131 J. RAWLS, supra note 84.
132 The "original position" is a hypothetical situation that Rawls posits. It forms
an initial status quo from which a group of rational and mutually disinterested people
reach a set of agreements that provide the basis of a just society. All persons in the
original position enjoy fundamental equality. Id. at 11-22, 118-92. See generally
Dworkin, The Original Position, in READING RAWLS 16 (N. Daniels ed. 1975).
13 The veil of ignorance is a condition Rawls imposes upon the participants in the
original position: none of them knows anything about him or herself, such as social
status or natural abilities, that could differentiate him or herself from the other
participants. J. RAWLS, supra note 84, at 12, 136-42.
134 Rawls argues as much. Id. at 18-19.
135 See id. at 251-57; Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. PHIL.
515 (1980).
136 See generally J. RAWLS, supra note 84, at 178-79, 440-46.
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principle of strict equality with respect to basic liberties. 37 The extent of
this set of liberties is unclear, but it includes for Rawls at least universal
suffrage with majority rule; freedom of conscience (moral and religious),
speech, and assembly; and freedom from arbitrary arrest as defined by the
rule of law. 13s Restrictions on these basic liberties are permissible only in the
interest of increasing the amount of liberty experienced by all.' 39 Thus, an
expanded set of universal and preferred rights might, for example, be put
beyond the reach of majority rule. But, Rawls obviously views this set of
rights as indeterminate. Any number of constitutional regimes might satisfy
the equal liberty principle. The important feature is equality. Rawls sees no
sufficient reason for any contractor to forego equal liberty; for, in his view,
this strict equality is so related to self-respect that (barring extreme circum-
stances) no one would forego equal liberty for social or economic advance-
ment. 1
40
The second principle relates to problems of economic and social position.
Here Rawls rejects strict equality on the grounds that the self-interested, but
temporarily ignorant, contractor need not forego the possibilities for material
advancement that inequality could provide for every person, even the worst
off. All he need do is ensure that should he end up as the worst off, he would
nonetheless be better off than under a regime of strict equality.14 ' This
insight leads to Rawls' second principle of justice, which requires (a) that
inequalities be attached to positions and offices available to all under condi-
tions of fair equality of opportunity and (b) that advances in the position of
better-off persons be limited by the requirement that the position of the
worst-off be maximized. 1
42
This principle might, like the first principle, be satisfied by a large number
of constitutional and legislative arrangements. 43 Certain approaches to so-
cial arrangements, however, would be proscribed. Slavery and other "ar-
bitrary" classifications relating to personal legal status would be illegiti-
mate, 144 as would simple attempts to maximize total or average utility.
4 5
Rawls further believes that the operation of this second principle, by reduc-
ing extremes of social and economic position and reinforcing bonds of social
fraternity, supports the priority of the first principle. Liberty becomes more
desirable as basic economic needs are assured, and more closely associated
with self-respect as extremes of wealth and position are eliminated.
146
137 Id. at 60, 302. See generally id. at 243-51.
138 Id. at 61.
139 See id. at 61, 302.
140 See id. at 542-43.
141 See id. at 64-65, 151.
142 Id. at 60, 302. See generally id. at 65-90.
141 For example, in the economic realm, either welfare capitalism or liberal
socialism would be acceptable. Id. at 274-84.
144 See id. at 248. See also id. at 84.
145 See id. at 64-65, 150-92.
146 See id. at 542-45.
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This rather straightforward statement of Rawls' two principles of justice,
of course, provides little of the subtlety, insight, or interconnectedness of his
arguments. I am here only concerned, however, with those aspects of
Rawls' theory that could give a firmer foundation to intuitive notions of
dignitary process rights.
We may begin by tentatively excluding consideration of the second princi-
ple; for if process rights are merely fungible parts of what Rawls calls
"primary goods"--all those things it is rational to desire because they are
instrumental in achieving particular goals in life' 47-then they can form no
part of a constitutionally preferred set of rights. 148 Constitutional preference
implies that these rights not be overridden by majority vote, and Rawls'
system permits no trades of basic liberties-majority rule included-for
other, lesser primary goods. ' 49 Basic liberties are by definition things that we
want no matter what other things we also have or desire. 150 Hence, unless
process rights beyond majority rule can be given a place in the set of basic
liberties that might be adopted, they cannot be allowed to restrict the basic
liberty of majority rule.
That due process claims should be considered "liberties" rather than
mere "goods" is not surprising. We are accustomed to thinking of Bill of
Rights protections in "liberty" terms. But the conception of process rights
as "Rawlsian liberties" is not generally straightforward or unambiguous, nor
does it lead easily to the priority of those rights as constitutional protections.
The clearest notion of process rights in Rawls' theory applies to legislative
processes. He argues-at least some of the time-that equal participation-
one-person-one-vote, majority rule, offices open to all-is essential to the
notion of equal liberty. ' 5' However, when Rawls moves beyond voting rules
to concern himself with the application of legal rules, he connects that
function directly to the rule of law.15 2 Such a conception primarily provides
support not for "process values" in adjudication, but, in Rawls' own words,
for a system "reasonably designed to ascertain the truth."' 15 3 The rule of
law, for Rawls as for Locke, is not itself a concept of liberty, but rather a
means of implementing such liberties as are available. 5 4 The notion is both
limited and instrumental: unless the law is reasonably clear concerning the
141 Id. at 62.
148 Nor, as Frank Michelman demonstrates, does the second principle generate a
set of "insurance" or "welfare" rights having special constitutional significance.
Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls' Theory
of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 962, 967-97 (1973).
149 Although Rawls includes liberties among his "social primary goods," J.
RAWLS, supra note 84, at 62, he later establishes, by what he calls "the priority of
liberty," that "liberty can be restricted only for the sake of liberty itself." Id. at 244.
110 See id. at 542-43.
Ms' Compare id. at 221-28 with id. at 247.
152 Id. at 58-60, 238-39.
153 Id. at 239.
i"4 See id. at 239-40.
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citizens' rights and duties, and administered through a rational process
reasonably designed to produce accurate (and therefore regular and consis-
tent) applications, there can be no secure expectations with respect to equal-
ity of access to the basic liberties. 5
This is not to suggest that Rawls' views of due process are necessarily
inconsistent with the notion of process values. The values most closely
connected with the rule of law-predictability, transparency, and
rationality-can be instrumental both to correct results and to the support of
self-respect. Indeed, one might argue that because the Rawlsian conception
of justice is at base directed toward the preservation of the primary value of
self-respect,1 56 the pursuit of correct results in the well-ordered or just
society may be indistinguishable from the pursuit of dignitary values. Yet,
Rawls clearly does not conceive of a good adjudicatory process as indepen-
dently or directly supporting citizens' sense of self-worth. Regularity of
application is enough for a theory concerned primarily with the justice of
substantive claims.
We must also beware of making more of the demand for "dignified" or
"self-respecting" adjudicatory process on the basis of Rawls' theory than
Rawls himself makes. It cannot blandly be asserted that a thinker who gives
the primacy Rawls does to self-respect would surely applaud its pursuit
through judicial elaboration of a broad due process clause. A Theory of
Justice is much too intricately balanced for such facile claims; Rawls is also
concerned with institutions, and he clearly views judicial review as a move
away from equality of political participation. In at least some of his discus-
sions of liberty, the counter-majoritarian difficulty is a stark reality.15 7 He
admits that bills of rights and judicial review might be developed in ways that
maintain equal liberty, 5 8 but there is no strong belief here for the inclusion of
process rights in constitutional arrangements-beyond the dictates of equal
political liberty and the rule of law.
Perhaps the strongest case for constitutionalizing process values in pursuit
of self-respect that comports with Rawls' theory is this: in a less than
well-ordered state, in which legislation proceeds from bargaining rather than
from a rational attempt to implement the two principles of justice, a process
of rational constitutional adjudication might legitimately restrain or supple-
ment majoritarian institutions. And as a part of the judicial activity tending
to promote the ultimate achievement of the just state, the court may find it
beneficial, even necessary, to impose process restraints on administrative
decisionmaking. Moreover, it might be beneficial in such a situation to
construct process requirements in ways that not only promote attention to
the rational ends of administrative decisionmaking, but that also support a
"s See id. at 235-43.
156 See id. at 440.
157 See, e.g., id. at 228-29.
158 See id. at 224.
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sense of self-respect that is otherwise inadequately promoted by the existing
organization of society.
We might, proceeding in this prudential way, construct, for example, a
basis for reasongiving. At least in the Kantian-Rawlsian perfectionist ver-
sion of liberalism, human dignity and self-respect are rational constructions.
Kant emphasizes the dual role of reason in moral action: reason is the will's
tutor as well as its handmaiden, both the means by which the good will is
formed and the means for constructing good actions in daily life. 159 As with
Rawls, 160 one can at least say that Kant would view as immoral institutional
arrangements that interfered with either function of rationality. Pincoffs'
analysis is thus on firmer ground when he hinges Roth's need for information
on his need to be able to regulate his own future behavior. 161 Processes that
are wholly uninformative, yet potentially meaningful, constrain individuals
in their endeavor to act as free and rational beings. And, at some level of
opacity or seeming arbitrariness, combined with substantial state involve-
ment in our lives, such processes would tend to undermine the bases for
individual self-respect.
A fundamental demand for rational processes of social decisionmaking is
thus a fair implication from Kantian moral theory. But the individual's right
to know the reasons for official action need not imply an extensive right to
processes that would require the public agency to behave rationally. That
the agency or official is mistaken or foolish in some-even many-cases may
thwart our desires, but it need not impair our capacity to understand what
has happened and to take whatever moral instruction is appropriate to the
occasion. For a process to be "rational" in this sense is only for it to be
comprehensible-a much thinner sense of rationality than the Benthamite
accuracy-seeking process that dignitary theorists have found inadequate.
2. The Liberal Consensus
Some interesting implications arise from this modest foray through
classical and contemporary liberal thought. It seems clear that we were
correct to be concerned about intuitive claims as to process. If we view those
claims to personal autonomy, to "doing what one wants," then we must (if
we are to be coherent) make liberalism's classic move (from Locke to Mill to
Nozick) to separate the private from the public sphere. Dignitary claims then
take on the character of substantive restraints on state power. Acceptable
characteristics of processes mediating interpersonal or intergroup conflict
would be either consensual (in the private sphere) or, when the processes
are designed to further public purposes, subject to restraints regarding
reasonable accuracy and public encroachment on protected zones of pri-
'9 I. KANT, supra note 115, at 10-11, 29.
160 This idea is captured in Rawls' theory by the notion of "reflective equilib-
rium." See, e.g., J. RAWLS, supra note 84, at 20, 48-51.
161 See note 118 and accompanying text supra.
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vacy. It appears that claims to participation in public processes must, on the
other hand, take the form of utilitarian-instrumentalist arguments or claims
to equal respect. And no matter which form the claims take, mainstream
liberal thought gives them only a limited determinate content: (a) equally
weighted voting under conditions of majority rule; (b) equal application of
legal rules; and (c) the avoidance of incomprehensibility.
This is not, of course, to say that ideals like "participation in public
process" or "opportunities for revelation" have no contribution to make in
realizing the ultimate liberal value of individual self-respect. It is merely to
say that they do not seem to be a part of the core conditions for realizing
liberal values. Participation and revelation contain contradictions, or raise
counterarguments, which suggest that they can be pursued only in a pruden-
tial fashion-by weighing them against other values. They cannot be as-
serted as virtually absolute constitutional rights, to be respected on pain of
transforming the body politic into a nonliberal regime.
Those in quest of a richer set of dignitary process requirements will have
to move beyond the basic tenets of liberalism, or construct a complex
prudential argument that connects additional protections to the concepts of
majority rule, rationality, and privacy. Both of these approaches are to some
degree feasible, and we can provide at least a sketch of how the prudential
argument might proceed in the context of a brief discussion of the implemen-
tation of a dignitary theory.
III. IMPLEMENTING A DIGNITARY THEORY
A. A Prudential Approach
A prudential approach merely asks, "What is necessary, given the con-
tingencies of modem government, to make effective the liberal state's
promises of privacy, equality, and comprehensibility in public decisional
processes?" To ask is not, of course, to answer, but the way the argument
proceeds is quite familiar. (For purposes of illustration, we shall here be
concerned only with the demands of equality and rationality.)
162
One begins with the notion that dignitary promises are not easily kept. The
clearest decisional-process implication of equality-majority rule-requires
support from several directions if it is to provide more than formal legitima-
tion of public decisionmaking. First, much "majority rule" is mediated,
rather than immediate-we have a representative, not a direct, democracy.
Second, the electoral process is subject to many well-known forms of
corruption-concentrations of power, information gaps, and so on. Third,
the voting process, whether at referendum or within representative as-
162 Process privacy claims are familiar in a wide range of evidentiary and pro-
cedural contexts. They need not be belabored here. Moreover, most of the demands
for a "dignitary" orientation to process have proceeded not from a concern for
privacy but for access and revelation.
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semblies, has some basic theoretical problems-often described as voting
paradoxes or agenda difficulties-which demand attention. 63 Fourth, the
output of the mediated voting process must be realized by administrative
action, which is susceptible to influences that might undermine effectuation
of such electoral preferences as survive to the stage of implementation.
64
Rationality in even the thin sense of "comprehensibility" is similarly
subject to constant challenge. In part, the challenge proceeds from the
weaknesses of the equality guarantee via majority rule. At the legislative
level, majority rule is the legitimizing rationale for particular policy choices.
We are to understand the output of the legislative process as simultaneously
making substantive choices and supporting equality. 165 But to the extent that
the difficulties of effectuating equality through majoritarianism have under-
mined the connection between policy choice and electoral preferences, that
"reason" seems implausible.
At the level of administrative implementation additional problems emerge.
Instrumentally rational pursuit of legislative policy confronts the ambiguity
and incoherence of legislative goals and the uncertainties of factfinding.'
66
An administrative articulation of a rationale instrumentally relating goal X to
state-of-the-world A hardly provides the assurances of rationality necessary
for responsible self-regulation when the citizen had presumed that goal Y
was intended and that situation B obtained. Thus, rich possibilities begin to
emerge for developing prudential legal rules demanding both legislative
specificity and accuracy-seeking administrative processes combined with
reasongiving.
There are also serious problems with structuring rational processes of
decisionmaking when more than a few decisionmakers are involved. Bu-
reaucratic decisionmaking should obviously strive for consistency across
deciders; a process in which who decides matters-perhaps more than the
articulated public policies or the facts-is an obvious example of arbitrari-
ness, and hence, from one perspective, of irrationality. 67 If the substantive
outputs of administration seem contradictory, or explicable only in terms of
the undisclosed propensities of different deciders, then we become, as K,
the objects of official caprice.
163 See generally B. ACKERMAN, supra note 49, at 289-93; Kramer, Some Pro-
cedural Aspects of Majority Rule, in DUE PROCESS, NoMos XVIII, at 264 (J. Pen-
nock & J. Chapman eds. 1977).
164 See Ackerman & Hassler, Beyond the New Deal: Coal and the Clean Air Act,
89 YALE L.J. 1466 (1980); Stewart, supra note 9, at 1682-87.
165 See Kuflik, Majority Rule Procedure, in DUE PROCESS, NoMos XVIII, at 296,
321-22 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1977); cf. id. at 323 (positing various justifica-
tions for majority rule, some reflecting concern for correctness of decisions, others
for equality and procedural fairness).
166 See generally Stewart, supra note 9.
167 See J. MASHAW, C. GOETZ, F. GOODMAN, W. SCHWARTZ, P. VERKUIL & M.
CARROW, SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS 42-48 (1978).
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Yet, we should be clear that however plausible-even compelling-the
arguments are for constructing prudential structures to support core de-
mands for equality and rationality, implementation will not be straight-
forward. A concern for rationality, for example, leads to concern with
inconsistency and apparent arbitrariness. Yet, the routines and ruleboun-
dedness that make consistency possible in bureaucracies are among our
prime examples of irrational behavior-the wooden inability to respond to
differences in context. We thus seem to confront a choice between the
irrationality of bureaucratic control and the irrationality of official discre-
tion.
Similarly, when we return to the question of support for majoritarianism,
we might think that the vagueness and mediateness of electoral decisions,
plus the possibilities for corruption and agenda manipulation, demand direct
participation by affected interests when administrators formulate implement-
ing subsidiary norms. Yet it is equally sensible to argue the opposite, that
more direct participation will in fact skew policy away from the desires of
the general electorate and toward the demands of "special interest groups,"
thus lessening the effectiveness of general arrangements that sustain equality
of voting power. 1
68
We need not pursue the whole litany of problems and potential solutions
to appreciate that in the prudential realm everything turns on one's apprecia-
tion of highly uncertain social, political, economic, and ])sychological fac-
tors. That is not to say that all these factors will never point in the same
direction. A decisional process, for example, that is neither consistent nor
capable of finely textured individual judgments is not faced with the dilemma
of choosing which of these ends to pursue at the expense of the other.
Moreover, when we are faced with this choice, the mere demand that the
official behave with sufficient rationality to provide an understandable legal
order does not of itself determine which horn of the dilemma will be chosen,
or whether some compromise between "systemic" and "intuitive" ra-
tiorality might not turn out to be prudent. In some circumstances we might
even wish to abandon transparent rationality entirely, either because the
dilemma is too poignant (the draft lottery) or the reasons too distressing
(allocation of life support systems).169 Prudential systems may balance and
accommodate values in an almost infinite variety of ways.
Notwithstanding these difficulties, the preceding discussion may point the
way toward a sensible strategy for implementing dignitary values in the
construction of administrative procedures. In outline, the argument pro-
ceeds, as follows: First, from the perspective of liberal theory, process values
have a rough hierarchy-equality (as embodied in majority rule), minimal or
"thin" rationality, 7 ' and some set of privacy constraints have been seen to
161 See, e.g., T. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM 68-72, 85-93 (1969).
169 G. CALABRESI & P. BOBBITT, supra note 57, at 57-62.
170 I do not mean here to reject a "thicker" accuracy-seeking requirement for the
protection of significant substantive entitlement, see note 92 and accompanying text
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be more fundamental to the preservation of a political morality based on
individual self-respect (i.e., liberalism) than are other values. These values
therefore have strong claims to implementation via judicial review for con-
stitutionality. Such claims may be defeated only by a demonstration that the
procedures under review in fact seek to realize these values in plausible
ways. Second, additional prudential or derivative values (individualization,
direct participation, and the like) present prima facie constitutional claims
for realization. They are the means for giving the basic values a content that
realistically confronts the social context of the individual self. These claims
may, however, be defeated by the recognition that the challenged process
is explicable as a trade-off among competing values. Notwithstanding the
weakness of these claims as constitutional standards they may, because of
their prima facie status, have powerful effects as principles of statutory
construction.
Thus far, of course, it would appear that we have labored long and hard,
sometimes tediously, to bring forth, yet again, a two-tier approach that is as
objectionable as it is familiar. But wait awhile. For there are two significant
differences between the theory propounded here and the two-tier formula of
fundamental and other values that has previously been so influential in equal
protection analysis, 17" ' and, to a lesser degree, in due process analysis. 172
First, the criterion of "fundamentalness" employed here has some persua-
sive claim to more than intuitive plausibility. It relies on the consensus
elements of liberal political theory, a philosophic tradition that virtually all
would agree provides the ideological bedrock for the construction of Amer-
ican constitutional theory. Second, the hierarchy that is suggested is capable
of a reasonably straightforward, albeit sometimes moderately sophisticated,
application to the due process problems that have confronted the Supreme
Court. More importantly, that application seems to solve those problems in
coherent and (reasonably) convincing ways.
B. Some Hypothetical Applications
Perhaps the simplest way to proceed is by way of example-to consider a
series of equality and rationality claims and how they might be analyzed. As
we shall see, the application is not always nonproblematic, but it is not
particularly elusive either. Consider the following:
supra, nor to deny the connection of that approach to preserving individual liberties.
That conception of due process is, however, peripheral to a discussion of a non-
positivist, noninstrumentalist dignitary approach.
171 See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17,
40 (1973); Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolv-
ing Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV.
L. REV. 1 (1972); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV.
1065 (1969).
172 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56 (1973).
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1. Hypothetical #1: The Interplay of Primary (Constitutional) and
Secondary (Statutory) Claims'73
The substantive context involves recoupment of wrongfully paid AFDC
benefits. The federal statutory standard, let us assume, provides for re-
coupment except where the refund would create "undue hardship" and the
recipient has received the benefits in "good faith." Assume further that state
X has taken the position, as a matter of regulatory policy, that recipients who
received improper payments because of their failure to report changes in
earnings cannot satisfy the "good faith" standard. The claimant, who admit-
tedly received improper payments because of a delay in reporting increased
income, requests a hearing in which to demonstrate "good faith." She offers
to prove that illness during the relevant time period prevented notification of
the welfare department concerning the changed circumstances. The request
for hearing is denied because of the previously announced policy.
The welfare recipient has two plausible due process claims. The first is
that the refusal to consider individual circumstances is irrational. If her
proofs are accepted, then she obviously did not act in "bad faith" when she
failed to report increased income during the relevant time period. Denial of
an opportunity to make those proofs would thus create an irrational process
for deciding questions of good faith. The second due process claim is that
because the hearing process refuses to hear her excuse, although it hears
excuses from persons overpaid for other reasons, there is an obvious in-
equality in access to hearings among potentially affected persons.
Because these claims state plausible denials of process rationality and
process equality, the plaintiff will be entitled to prevail unless the state can
defend its action in the same terms that the case is stated. This is so because
core value claims are not subject to being balanced against other consid-
erations; a core value claim must be met with a core value response. The
defendant must now talk about rationality and equality, not economy.
How might the state proceed? Its defense must, I think, begin by elaborat-
ing the meaning of rationality and equality. The state's equality defense is
straightforward and determinative. First, there is obviously no violation of
general voting rules involved here. Second, there is no special rule for this
claimant's case. The attempt to compare her position to the cases of others
to whom the rule does not apply is really an attack on the rationality of the
rule, not the equality of the process, and it must be dealt with as such.
Finally, she makes no claim about problems of "participation" in the devel-
opment of the policy, so that sort of equality-supporting, prudential argu-
ment is not at issue here.
We turn then to the rationality claim. But here again the core value has
been respected. The process is rational in the sense that it gives reasons. The
claimant's case obviously fits under the rule. The decision is thus transpar-
"I3 This hypothetical is based loosely on Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682
(1980).
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ent and comprehensible. When the claimant says more, that the process is
irrational because it produces errors due to overgeneralization, her claim
moves into the prudential realm. It becomes one for "individualization."
Prudential claims such as "individualization" are prima facie winners, but
they can be defeated by other countervailing interests. The state will proba-
bly focus its defense on the relationship of the challenged rule to "consis-
tent" decisionmaking. And, consistency, after all, is one meaning of ra-
tionality. Pursuing this line of defense the state would first urge that dis-
cretionary judgments by a number of hearing officers concerning the good
faith of persons who fail to report income changes would lead to inconsistent
and, therefore, irrational (and unequal) administration of the "good faith"
test. It thus promotes rationality in administration to use a rulemaking
process to develop a general norm that can be consistently applied in
subsequent decisional processes.
The state's defense need not prevail. The plaintiff might yet demonstrate
that the choice between the types of rationality to be pursued was
unnecessary-that there was no basis, in experience or otherwise, for the
judgment that administration would be inconsistent under the general
standard-so the state could have relatively costlessly allowed, and theie-
fore must allow, for individualized determinations. But, obviously, the going
will be tough.
A critic of the results of this example might, of course, argue that if that's
the way the theory works, it justifies obvious irrationality. "Good faith," the
critic would argue, obviously implies individualized judgment. And, I would
reply as follows: either the critic means to say that there is in general a single
perspective on rationality in administration, or he means to say that under
this statute only a single perspective is permissible. The former meaning is
too obviously false to require discussion. The latter argument may be a good
one, but it is not a constitutional argument. It is a challenge to the authority
of the agency under the statute. The question then becomes a question of
statutory interpretation, of what protections are afforded by the positive
law.
At the level of statutory construction many other questions are, of course,
also relevant: the general structure of the statute, the language of other
related sections, legislative history, and so on. But one can imagine a quite
common scenario in which the prima facie case for individualization will
carry the day: the general statutory structure is one in which there is a rigid
general rule-recoupment-which may be relaxed by reference to a waiver
standard--"good faith"--that appears designed to permit individualization.
The legislative history is silent concerning the anticipated means of imple-
menting the waiver provision. The rule-making authority that has been exer-
cised is of the general empowering type, "to make such needful rules and
regulations, etc." In these circumstances, a decision that the administrator
has misconstrued the statute because he failed to give appropriate weight to
the value of individualization would be justified. And because it is a non-
constitutional ruling, the judicial construction would not preclude ma-
1981]
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joritarian reversal or modification of that judgment. Judicial review based on
a generous positivism-one informed by attention to dignitary process
values-may be simultaneously protective and modest.
2. Hypothetical #2: Roth's Case
174
The term contract of a nontenured state college professor is not renewed.
The teacher claims he had a due process right to a statement of reasons and
an evidentiary hearing before being fired.
As in the previous hypothetical, the plaintiff has no very plausible equality
claim. Everyone on a term contract gets the same process-some form of
evaluation and judgment. The fundamental problem relates to the rationality
of the process. For all Roth can tell the judgment is based on whim. Because
he is provided no reason, Roth is treated as a being for whom reasons are
unimportant-an obvious affront to his self-respect.
The question is what the state college may say in defense. How can the
failure to provide a reason be consistent with the value of rationality? In my
view it cannot be. A reason must be provided as a constitutional mini-
mum. 7 5 But as we saw in the previous hypothetical, a reason alone may or
may not be enough. There is still the question of what counts as a reason-
another way of stating the prudential argument for substantive rationality.
And lurking in the background is our prior concern with how the rationality
principle, once loosed on the administrative process, stops short of requiring
that administrative judgments be absolutely correct in all cases.
Let us, therefore, elaborate. Suppose, for example, the college president's
letter says that Roth is not rehired because "I don't like you." Is that a
reason? Of course. If Roth has a claim in these circumstances, it will relate
to the authority of the president, under the governing legislation, to hire and
fire on the basis of personal preference.
More commonly we would expect the president to give reasons such as:
"It is necessary to cut back our staff by five percent"; or "Better qualified
candidates are available to us"; or "Your teaching (research, etc.) have not
been of a quality that justifies retention." These are also, obviously, rational
answers. They give reasons; they are not internally contradictory. Yet, Roth
may certainly want more. To each of the president's reasons we can imagine
him saying: "Why me?"; "How better qualified?"; and, "What precisely are
my shortcomings?"
174 This hypothetical is based on Roth, 408 U.S. 564, discussed in the dialogue in
text following note 23 supra and in text accompanying notes 117-18 supra.
175 On the present Supreme Court only Justice Marshall seems, explicitly, to hold
this view. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 588-89 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Yet, soroe such
notion seems implicit in the majority opinion in Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560
(1975) (Secretary of Labor must supply explanation of decision in order to facilitate
judicial review under Administrative Procedure Act).
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These are again perfectly reasonable sorts of questions. Moreover, assum-
ing that some answers are forthcoming, they lead ineluctably to a further
round of queries of the "How do you know that?" sort. And in the next
iteration, Roth can be expected to begin asserting that certain facts are
wrong, or have been considered out of context, and to start demanding some
further process for testing facts and placing them in proper perspective.
Does a prudential right to process rationality carry him that far?
At the level of stating a claim, the answer is obviously "yes." But the
possibilities for adequate defense by the state are so substantial that one is
hard pressed to imagine that Roth would prevail. For the rationality of
declining further process could be established from a number of directions:
the impact of such processes on the resources available for the principal
mission of the school; the effects of contentious processes on the willingness
of supervisory personnel to act on their convictions in replacing existing
staff; the low probability that proceedings will illuminate, rather than mis-
direct, decisionmaking that is subjective, incremental, comparative, and
synthesizing. Any of these reasons, unless Roth can show that they are
empty, would support the rationality of limiting Roth's involvement in the
decisional process to the simple receipt of a reason. They, therefore, dispose
of his constitutional claims to "participation" as well as to "rationality."
Would a presumptive right to participate nevertheless carry the day for Roth
were he to argue that the general education statutes should be "interpreted"
to provide him with some kind of hearing? Given the general legal presump-
tion that personal services contracts are nonrenewable, indeed terminable,
at will, it seems unlikely, although not unimaginable. And such an argument
would involve a prudential balancing process that considers the support that
participation can give both to individual self-respect and to the achievement
of collective ends. It could not proceed deductively from an absolute con-
stitutional right.
These hypotheticals-indeed, any number of additional hypotheticals-
could be further developed and analyzed. Enough has been said, however,
to provide an idea of how dignitary theory can be applied in practice. There
is also at least some indication from these examples of potential strengths
and weaknesses. Although we began with a robust set of intuitive claims, the
approach has proved rather restrained. The theory has some bedrock, non-
tradeable rights-reasongiving and majority rule-but these are, standing
alone, relatively thin protections. For although this theory avoids initial
''positivist traps," it may refer many process issues to the construction of
the positive law. A "generous positivism" may indeed be the appropriate
label under which to proceed in further elaborating prudential process pro-
tections having their fundamental basis in the liberal ideal of individual
self-respect.
For those who would vigorously "constitutionalize" administrative pro-
cess in pursuit of dignitary values and who distrust balancing, the challenge
is clear. Some basis beyond liberal theory is required to justify the pursuit.
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IV. FROM LIBERTY TO FRATERNITY
That liberal theory should fail to provide a robust vision of process values
will be, to many, unsurprising. The conventional criticism of individualist
moral and political ideas-a criticism elegantly and forcefully stated by
Robert Paul-Wolff in The Poverty of Liberalism'76-explains the procedural
barrenness of liberal theory. As Wolff puts it, individualistic notions of
political rights are at war with man's basic sociability. 177 We are fundamen-
tally social beings, not individuals. Indeed, the concept of an individual is
coherent only in the context of social existence. Our fundamental demands
are not for separateness, but for community. 178 We want not merely to be
left alone, but to be related to others in significant ways. For Wolff an
individualistic foundation for a philosophy of politics is about as informative
as an explanation of the harmony of a string quartet that begins with the
thesis that the musicians are competing with each other to produce a solo. 1
79
Wolff s account, whether viewed as an account of individual psychology
or social reality, has some persuasive power. To send Roth away with a
reason sufficient for him to understand what has occurred to him may be
enough to protect his individuality, but it seems a niggardly response never-
theless. It is more likely that what Roth really wanted when he asked for a
"reason" was a conversation. His interest was not just in a statement, to
internalize as he might, but in a relationship in which he both knew and was
known. For it may be that we cannot, after all, ever know ourselves except
as mediated and reinforced by association with others.
180
From this perspective, demands for participation take on life and force.
Notions of equality and rationality that seem somehow sterile when they
are interpreted as creating equal rights to pull a voting machine's lever and to
receive a reason from an official are energized when they are reconceived as
promoting an ongoing dialogue in a community of equals.' 8 ' And it is this
conception that seems to motivate much of the dignitary theory literature-a
conception that Frank Michelman recognized in describing his discussion as
a discussion of "associational aims" in due process. 8 2
It is not quite cricket, of course, for Wolff to suggest that liberal thought
ignores demands for community. A cheerful reading of the history of liberal
ideas might rather describe mediating the competition between individualist
and associational drives as the central problem liberal thinkers have set for
themselves-a problem resolvable in a variety of ways, none of which
176 R. WOLFF, THE POVERTY OF LIBERALISM (1968).
177 Id. at 50.
178 Id. at 183-93.
179 Id. at 50.
180 See R. UNGER,'KNOWLEDGE AND-POLITICS 191-235 (1975).
181 As Bruce Ackerman has asked, "What would our social world look like if no
one ever suppressed another's questions of legitimacy, where every questioner met
with a conscientious attempt at an answer?" B. ACKERMAN, supra note 49, at 4.
182 Michelman, supra note 8.
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"forget" the duality of human nature.' 8 3 Indeed, the "communitarian"
perspective of the Scots "moral sense" school seems to have strongly
influenced Thomas Jefferson 8 4 and James Wilson. 18 5 Gordon Wood finds an
undifferentiated communitarian ethic permeating the intellectual atmosphere
at the founding of the American republic. 1
8 6
But these constitutionally signficant communitarian ideas lead in a familiar
direction-utilitarianism. The moral posture of the individual-benevolent
action-translated at the community level into the promotion of the greatest
good of the greatest number.' 8 7 The integration of the individual into the
moral community was achieved by internalizing the good of the community
as a maxim of individual moral action.1
8 8
Wolff must, therefore, be suggesting some transformation of our ideas that
goes further-that recognizes the separate reality and claims of community,
but presumably maintains the reality of individual freedom.' 8 9 But I must
confess that I have no clear vision of such a theory. 190 And the determina-
tion of what "due process" claims such a theory might entail must await the
event. In a world both genuinely communal and genuinely individualist,
adjudicable dignitary claims to process just might be beside the point. One
might even imagine such a theory leading to a rather Lockean distinction
between private realms of fraternal self-realization and public realms of
decisionmaking subject to the restraints of liberal constitutionalism. In such
a state a liberal legal order would protect the opportunity for fraternity, but
would not attempt to transform society into community.
183 See Kronman, Book Review, 61 MINN. L. REV. 167, 181-83 (1976) (reviewing
R. UNGER, supra note 180).
184 G. WILLS, supra note 99, at 200-06.
185 W. MCWILLIAMS, THE IDEA OF FRATERNITY IN AMERICA 193-94 (1973); G.
WILLS, supra note 99, at 250-51.
186 G. WOOD, supra note 85, at 53-59.
187 G. WILLS, supra note 99, at 248-55.
"8I See H. SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 387-89 (7th ed. 1907).
189 Wolff, himself, provides only a possibility theorem on the conceptual coher-
ence of a community value. R. WOLFF, supra note 176, at 163-95.
190 Nor will I here rehearse the candidates and what clouds my perception; for an
exemplary attempt at such a theory, see R. UNGER, supra note 180. Suffice it to say
that I suspect the theory to be "Rousseauean" in the sense that Frank Michelman
describes in Politics and Values on What's Really Wrong With Rationality Review?,
13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 487, 506-11 (1979). But as Michelman has also told us, supra
note 8, translating this vision into a demand for procedural review is much more
complicated than using it to explain our discomfiture at rationality cum efficiency as a
constitutional standard for valid substantive legislation.
19811
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